AFGHAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE REHABILITATION OF AFGHANISTAN

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PREFACE

This report was commissioned by the International Rescue Committee's Rural Assistance Program in Peshawar. Like other donors, the IRC's Rural Assistance Program has increased the amount of assistance channeled through Afghan non-governmental organizations (ANGOs). The sudden increase in numbers of ANGOs in the last year and questions concerning how they worked persuaded the IRC to commission an ANGO issues paper.

The study was conducted over a nine week period in Autumn 1991 by two researchers: one a senior social scientist with twenty years' experience in the Islamic world, including four in Peshawar; and the other a junior researcher, familiar with Pakistan and in Peshawar on a Watson Fellowship.

The researchers conducted close to 100 interviews (see Appendix B). About half of those were with Afghan NGOs, and the other half with donors, international non-governmental organizations and other knowledgeable individuals. The researchers wish to express their gratitude to all those who took their valuable time to share their experience and views. Thanks in particular are due to IRC/RAP staff, all of whom were very helpful to the researchers.

IRC would also like to thank Andy Eichfeld, who conducted close to half the interviews for this report, for volunteering his time. The study benefitted greatly from the additional information he provided and from his ability to synthesize information.

The views presented in this paper are those of the principal researcher and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of IRC.

ACRONYMS

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
AIG	Afghan Interim Government
ANCB	Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau
ANGO	Afghan non-governmental organization
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IRC/RAP	International Rescue Committee's Rural Assistance Program
MSH	Management Sciences for Health
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province
NAC	Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (formerly NCA)
NCA/NRC	Norwegian Church Aid/Norwegian Refugee Council
GOP	Government of Pakistan
SAFRON	States and Frontier Regions Ministry
SCF-UK	Save the Children Fund - UK
SWABAC	Southwest Afghanistan and Balochistan Agency for Coordination
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOCA	United Nations Office for Coordination in Afghanistan
WFP	World Food Program

All ANGO acronyms can be found in Appendix A, which lists Afghan NGOs.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghan non-governmental organizations (ANGOs) began forming in the early 1980s. There were few ANGOs until late 1989. These provided mostly health services and education for refugees. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan led to the sudden availability of large amounts of external aid, which in turn created a demand for organizations that could handle field implementation across the border. In 1990 and 1991, ANGOs began to form in considerable numbers in order to try to tap donor resources for rehabilitation. Donors, including multilateral and bilateral funding agencies and some international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), are largely responsible for the large increase in the number of Afghan NGOs. Most donors have been willing to make only small, short-term grants, divided into tranches, to ANGOs. This limits the potential for donor loss of funds due to NGO incompetence, risks of war, or malfeasance, but it means that a large number of implementing partners is required.

During the course of this study, the researchers identified more than 100 Afghan organizations seeking funding for rehabilitation and refugee-related activities. They label themselves NGOs and there is no registration process that discriminates between legitimate Afghan NGOs and groups attached to extra-legal business interests, commanders, political parties, the Afghan Interim Government or the Government of Pakistan.

The number of Afghan NGOs will probably continue to grow, at least for a while. The current number exceeds the funds available and the capacity of donors to supervise and monitor cross-border projects. Some of the ANGOs will probably wither from lack of resources, but many may continue to live some sort of a half-life for some period of time.

There are many compelling reasons to implement projects through ANGOs. The large number of Afghan and international NGOs has permitted an increase in the number of rehabilitation activities and the expansion of such activities into remote parts of the country. ANGOs bring greater civilian and Afghan involvement into the process of planning and implementing reconstruction assistance. They provide on-the-job training for a large number of Afghan professionals who may work in various kinds of organizations after the war. ANGO formation is also a kind of employment generation. Opportunities to work in one's field of specialization have been very limited for Afghans since 1980 but have now increased. It is possible that a different vision of employment possibilities will emerge from this experiment with non-governmental organizations, and that in time the government will not be seen as the employer of first resort, as it was in Afghanistan before the war.

In addition to the value of direct professional experience, a larger number of Afghans are gaining experience in managing organizations. Since INGOs still have expatriates making major policy and programming decisions, there is value in ANGOs offering parallel opportunities to Afghans. ANGOs also expose a wider range of Afghans to systems, thought processes and individuals in the donor community. This exposure and resultant understanding may help a new government lobby successfully for assistance and may also help it develop sensible policies on accepting and using foreign aid. Further, the direct experience of working in rural areas, something which is quite new to many in the Kabul-educated middle class, may produce more successful development strategies in the future.

The recent proliferation of rehabilitation organizations, however, is also creating problems. It has caused NGO congestion in some of the more popular and accessible parts of Afghanistan, leading to wasteful competition and inefficient use of resources. Scarce funds are spent on approximately 160 INGO and ANGO office rents, utilities, duplicated equipment, etc. The proliferation of groups has also meant that multiple standards prevail, making a mess which it will take years for any future government to sort out. Donors have some responsibility to try to set reasonable standards and enforce those standards for their grantees. No voluntary coordinating body, such as ACBAR, has the authority to play that kind of role.

Donors should take more care in selecting the ANGOs with which they will work. All donors would like to devise mechanical criteria for determining eligibility for funding because such criteria would reduce the necessity of making subjective judgements about an organization. Some preconditions that suggest a degree of accountability include 1) the existence of an external audit for which a donor has paid or an audit that the donor itself has carried out to its satisfaction; 2) an adequate number of staff qualified in the sector in which the proposal has been made and a track record of successfully implementing a project in that sector; 3) a more than nominal community contribution; 4) evidence that senior staff spend considerable time in Afghanistan; 5) evidence that there are few staff in Pakistan relative to staff based in or spending most of their time in Afghanistan; 6) projects proposed in a area in which monitoring is possible; 7) perhaps the existence of a permanent NGO field office in the area where the NGO is proposing to work; and 8) evidence that the ANGO's spending priorities are on beneficiary-targeted activities and not on head office costs.

Donors should do more to encourage community contributions to ANGO and INGO work to reduce the cost of rehabilitation, foster sustainability, increase the community's interest in accountability, and reduce the interest or the ability of the group to favor kinfolk or meet political objectives if charges for goods or services are levied. The closer the ANGO's charge is to the real market value of a good or service, the less interest there may be among the community's elite in securing preferential access.

Almost all ANGOs are dependent on external donor resources, and there is little that they can do in this environment to increase their financial independence. No NGO can plan for its organization given the current funding pattern of short-term, small grants. It would be difficult to do a six month plan, let alone a one year plan. Many have lost staff, due to short or longer term cash-flow problems. Most ANGOs are expanding in an unplanned fashion into sectors for which they believe they can secure funding. This is not a recipe for organizational success, but they have little choice given the way donors currently handle funding. Limited donor support for overhead and administrative charges also makes it difficult for groups which do not have some consistent source of external funding to improve their capacity and efficiency.

Once a group has an established and satisfactory track record, it would be appropriate for donors to split among themselves the reasonable overhead expenses of that group. In addition, donors could join together (preventing duplication) to provide technical assistance and training to those Afghan groups that have proved responsible and help these organizations develop annual plans.

Many donors follow a policy of spreading resources among a large number of groups in order to protect themselves against unacceptable losses or political impact. This probably offers less protection than some careful initial checking. Monitoring cannot consistently answer questions about a group's objectives, given the pressures that are put on monitors and the fact that monitors may have their own biases. More joint monitoring is needed, and donors should talk to a range of parties who might have information on the concerned group. While complete consensus may not emerge, the donor will know whether some degree of caution and further checking might be required. The closer the political or commander links a group is thought to have, the more thorough the monitoring needs to be.

Most donors have not been interested in supporting the growth of voluntary agencies. Their concern is to identify and fund effective partner organizations that can work across party and commander boundaries. Therefore, donors implicitly, if not explicitly, allow a very broad definition of NGO to prevail. Some donors appear to see ANGOs as short-term expedients through which large amounts of funding can be quickly spent, and they have only

the most limited commitment to helping Afghan groups establish themselves for the longer term.

If donors wish to contribute to the de-militarization of Afghan society and enlarge society's civilian voice through support for the emergence of civilian groups, they need to try to distinguish between groups and to encourage and support those with a pronounced community or rehabilitation, rather than political, focus. ANGOs can serve to increase the flow of information to communities and reduce party and commander monopoly of information and discussion. It is possible that some ANGOs, with strong community support, could moderate the pressures a commander can place on the community. At the same time, ANGOs can help expose communities to broader points of view. With time, they may become effective proponents of the interests of those communities they serve, and may help communicate local needs and desires to government and international agencies.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Purpose of the Study

Afghan non-governmental organizations (ANGOs) have been operating for several years, with the first ones formed in the early 1980s to provide mostly health services and education to refugees. Only a handful of ANGOs existed until late 1989, when the sudden availability of large amounts of external aid following the Soviet withdrawal required organizations that could handle field implementation.

At that time, the United Nations (UN) agencies found that their cross-border mandate prohibited funding through resistance-organized political or military groups. Potential implementors thus included only international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and a few ANGOs, with few of these operating cross-border. The idea of funding local shuras was popular for a time, but these councils often proved ephemeral and incapable. They were also frequently dominated by commanders. The UN agencies were therefore perhaps the first to spur the formation of Afghan non-governmental organizations directed by what the UN hoped were neutral Afghan technocrats.

Beginning in 1990, other donors also began to show greater interest in funding Afghan NGOs. A recognition developed that the interest of some INGOs (and their funding from their home countries) might not last forever. Some INGOs, such as Freedom Medicine (FM) and Medecins sans Frontieres/France (MSF/France), have disappeared from Peshawar. This impermanence contrasted with what was expected to be a longer term commitment from the Afghan NGOs. Certainly, some Afghan NGOs have shown astonishing commitment, surviving since the early 1980s despite threats, assassinations, and funding uncertainties. Many in the donor community thought that it made more sense to fund and strengthen Afghan groups that could become a permanent resource to their country and could serve as more effective intermediaries with Afghan communities.

This heightened interest in supporting Afghan entities, particularly for cross-border rehabilitation, has met with a resounding response from Afghans of all backgrounds and convictions. Appendix A lists over 100 Afghan organizations calling themselves NGOs, most of which have been formed since early 1990. This list does not pretend to be all-inclusive. The researchers do not doubt that they have missed some ANGOs, or that some on the list are no longer active.

The rapid increase in the number of Afghan NGOs has created a certain amount of cynicism among both Afghans and expatriate aid workers and called into question the process of forming private Afghan entities for rehabilitation and relief. One senior Afghan

technocrat, founder of one of the oldest Afghan NGOs, rather scathingly calls the new groups 'UN NGOs', rather than ANGOs, reflecting the United Nations Office for Coordination in Afghanistan's (UNOCA) role of inviting such groups into existence and registering practically all applicants. Another senior Afghan ANGO director suggests that UNOCA was naive in encouraging the proliferation of Afghan groups and inadvertently exacerbating competition between INGOs and ANGOs. Naive or not, the call for ANGOs was in good measure due to the need for more implementing agencies through which donor resources could be channelled.

With such a large number of ANGOs, all created during the same time period, it becomes very difficult to determine which group is serious and which is not, which has a political agenda and which is basically apolitical, which group is potentially competent and which is not. Both the sudden increase in numbers of Afghan NGOs and the heightened enthusiasm of donors in funding such groups make IRC's call for an examination of ANGO issues timely. It is hoped that this study will be of interest to those involved in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

The focus of this paper is primarily on Afghan entities working cross-border. Those Afghan organizations serving refugees make very important contributions but there are far fewer concerns in funding them as their work is more visible and their funding, at least currently, is less.

B. Methodology for Conducting the Research and Research Problems

The primary method of data collection was the use of semi-structured interviews. An interview guide was prepared and used in interviews with forty-eight ANGOs based in Peshawar and Quetta. More casual information about groups not interviewed was also collected. ANGOs selected for interview were chosen in an attempt to obtain a representative mix: new groups; better established groups; engineering groups; health groups; women's groups; multiple sector groups; regional groups; large groups; small groups; and Pushtoon, Hazara and Farsiwan groups. Selection also depended in part on whether a senior staff person was available for an interview. Appendix B lists those groups interviewed.

Conversations with donors and other interested parties were less structured but all donors were asked about pre-conditions for funding, proposal guidelines, monitoring, and experience with ANGOs and how that experience compared with that of funding INGOs. Various documents were also reviewed.

The major weakness of the research is that while interviews are very useful for collecting opinions, they are not good vehicles for collecting hard facts about sensitive matters. Respondents forget, mis-speak or have reasons for not sharing the truth. The researchers had no way of verifying whether the information collected in interviews was accurate but tried to check important pieces of information with different sources. Even then, there are serious questions about how to verify the statements of the verifiers. Without extensive travel in Afghanistan, fluent Afghan language skills, and an understanding of the culture, it is not possible to speak with any precision about what any one group represents. However, some broad patterns are apparent.

C. Overview of Afghan NGOs - Some Definitions

Because there is no registration process that conveys legitimacy (see Chapter IV), the term NGO is largely one that Afghans grant their own organizations. The bulk of these new organizations have been called NGOs by their founders because of donor eagerness to fund and support NGOs. The term NGO can have a very broad or a very narrow definition. Many using this term are talking about different kinds of institutions.

There are INGOs in Peshawar that are non-profit but which behave like businesses. They are NGOs in the sense that they are private institutions and not attached to a government or political party. They are not, however, voluntary agencies, receiving donations from the public, depending on volunteers, paying modest salaries to a very few office staff, making do with basic equipment, and accountable to a larger public.

UNOCA consultant Jane Thomas has noted repeatedly that even those INGOs that fit the voluntary agency model in their home countries do not appear to fit it in their Pakistan-based operations. She notes that Afghan NGOs have modelled themselves on the INGOs for which they have often worked directly and which they continue to encounter in coordinating groups. They may even have modelled themselves on INGOs in their very proliferation. Generally, ANGOs lack volunteer support, they do not receive contributions from the Afghan public, and there is no group of people to which they are accountable unless it is to a donor which has funded them. Some pay salaries and try to maintain offices that rival those of the INGOs, which are generally much better funded.

There are few examples in Afghanistan's history of organizations being formed and sustained to address special needs. Even awqaf, which started as private religious foundations in medieval times all over the Muslim world and through which hospitals and schools were endowed, had over time become government-controlled. The pre-war Red Crescent Society was a government entity in Afghanistan

rather than a private and voluntary one. Of course, there are traditions of villagers collecting to repair the mosque or kareze owners working cooperatively to maintain their irrigation system, but these examples are not equivalent to sustainable organizations devoted to one or more good causes. Volunteerism, itself, is rare in impoverished communities where people are most concerned with activities contributing directly to their own subsistence. The concept of a voluntary agency is both new and foreign, and it is not a surprise that the Afghans creating such groups do not necessarily understand Western models or expectations with respect to such agencies.

In fact, in reviewing the list of 100 plus Afghan groups calling themselves NGOs, it would probably be better and less confusing to use a term such as Afghan Implementing Agency. Some of the one hundred have split off from INGOs. Some are apolitical and see themselves as NGOs. Some are the creatures of one commander or are tied to one particular political party. A few appear to have been formed with strong Government of Pakistan (GOP) support and may therefore represent GOP interests as much as Afghan ones. Some have been formed by AIG senior officials. An anecdote told to one of the researchers concerned an ANGO director and senior AIG official who was not sure whether to give out his AIG business card or his NGO business card to his visitors. Rumors exist that other parts of the AIG are contemplating becoming NGOs and that some NGOs hope to become ministries. At least one group is part of the AIG Ministry of Health, part of the Shura-e-Nizar, and also at the same time an NGO. Some Afghan entities have probably been formed largely to make money; others may have been formed to give legitimate cover to other, illegitimate business activity.

Some NGOs have targeted refugees, while others work only cross-border. Many of the groups serving refugees are taking on cross-border activities as well, either out of interest or because there is limited funding for refugee activities. Some NGOs concentrate on one particular district or a few districts in Afghanistan while others work more widely. Some appear to have a strong base of support in a community, while the majority are organized more like consulting firms, with professional staff who are willing to work almost anywhere and do almost anything that a donor wants. Those groups organized by women target women and children. They work most often with refugees but some manage girls' schools in Afghanistan and some hope to undertake other kinds of activities cross-border.

Most of the groups at this point are Pushtoon, reflecting the greater degree of access to Pushtoon border areas and the fact that the majority of refugees are Pushtoon. A significant number are Hazara in composition and wish to serve the Hazara community. A few are Farsiwan and linked to the Shura-e-Nizar. Only a very few have ties to the Turkic populations of the north.

Most ANGOs interviewed say that they hope to remain as NGOs and expand their activities in the coming years, although many noted that their continued existence could depend on the attitude of some future government. Others indicate a clear intention to become part of a government ministry in the event that an acceptable government is formed in Kabul. Some, and this is particularly true of groups with strong engineering capabilities, would like to become engineering, design or construction firms, bidding on government and private contracts. In the current Afghan environment, however, it appears that the idea of groups making an explicit profit from rehabilitation activities is unacceptable.

II. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS IN FUNDING AFGHAN IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES

A. Potential Benefits

In many respects, the formation of Afghan assistance agencies is a useful development. They bring greater civilian and Afghan involvement into the process of planning and implementing reconstruction assistance. They provide on-the-job training for a large number of Afghan professionals who may work some day for a government ministry. Many of these Afghans, the younger ones in particular, may have had no prior experience in their fields but have spent the years following graduation as mujahideen. Even some of the older professionals who graduated from university faculties or technical colleges prior to the war may not have been able to hold jobs in their fields for many years.

Now, the large number of Afghan NGOs has created new employment opportunities for agriculturalists, engineers, and the like. In fact, the desire of Afghan professionals to work in the fields of their specializations has played a role in the formation of so many ANGOs. ANGO formation is in this instance a kind of employment generation. It may be that a different vision of employment possibilities will emerge from this experience, and that in time the government will not be seen as the employer of first resort, as it was in Afghanistan before the war and as it is in many developing countries.

In addition to the value of direct professional experience, a larger number of Afghans are developing skills in managing organizations. Since INGOs still have expatriates making major policy and programming decisions, there is considerable value in ANGOs offering a parallel opportunity to Afghans. ANGO directors may end up after the war in a variety of positions where their management experience would be useful.

ANGOs also give a wider range of Afghans exposure to the donor community and to how it functions and thinks. The improved understanding that results from this may help a new government lobby more successfully for assistance and may also help it develop more sensible policies on accepting and using foreign aid. In addition to this, the direct experience of working in rural areas, something which is quite new to many in the Kabul-educated middle class, may produce more successful development strategies in future.

The large number of ANGOs also serves to increase the flow of information to communities and in some measure reduces party and commander monopoly of information and discussion. At the same time, ANGOs may help expose communities to broader points of view. With time, ANGOs may become effective proponents of the interests

of those communities they serve, and may help communicate local needs and desires to the government and to international agencies interested in Afghanistan. It is possible that some ANGOs, with strong bases of support in a community, can moderate the pressures a commander is able to place on the community.

Certainly, the existence of Afghan NGOs has helped rehabilitation assistance reach remote areas of the country. ANGOs may have been most effective in reaching certain minority communities. There are natural limits to the growth of any organization and some INGOs have increased in size and funding beyond the point of effective management. They cannot absorb larger amounts of donor assistance, and they can only meet a small portion of the rehabilitation requirements of Afghanistan or the continuing needs of refugees. Implementing agencies in addition to INGOs are needed, particularly while there is no acceptable government structure through which to work.

ANGOs may ultimately be more acceptable to the communities in which they work than INGOs. Most INGOs at this point are Western and are seen as being Christian organizations with possible ulterior motives. Some of the Western NGOs have of course been missionary groups. The Arab groups, while they have the advantages of being fellow Muslims, are still foreigners and are often viewed as purveyors of an interpretation of Islam unacceptable to many Afghans.

Many hope that Afghan-managed institutions will be more politically aware than INGOs, will have a better understanding of how to handle local relations in order to work effectively, and will have a clearer sense of who their staff are and what they are doing. This may be true. At the same time, Afghan agency directors are clearly more vulnerable than their expatriate INGO counterparts. Two Afghan NGO directors have been assassinated, while at least two have fled Pakistan because of threats against their lives. Others have received repeated threats, but show great courage and continue working.

ANGO directors, in order to survive (both literally and in the figurative sense of their organizations continuing) may at times be obliged to give into pressures of various kinds. INGOs may also give into pressures but perhaps more out of political naivete. Most ANGOs are unlikely to suffer from naivete but their political instincts will have to be very good indeed in order to circumvent pressures.

One form of pressure on both ANGO and INGO staff comes from commanders. Many Afghan agencies complained about commanders insisting upon a share of donor largesse. Most ANGOs said that they had been able to avoid complying, largely by threatening to withdraw and work somewhere else. This may be an easy threat to

activate when a group is in the early stages of its work in an area, but once a group is entrenched and has equipment on site and various activities underway, it becomes harder to pull out. It may also be true that groups working in their home areas are not able even to threaten to stop work but must somehow try to manage the pressure. Several groups indicated that once they had completed an activity in an area, their credibility with the community increased by leaps and bounds. In some cases, the community had defended the NGO against commanders.

Another advantage pointed out by a recent United Nations Development Program (UNDP) evaluation is the significantly lower costs of organizations that are entirely Afghan in composition. This is particularly true compared to organizations with significant numbers of expatriates. Of course, most of the groups with larger numbers of expatriates are at this point more experienced as institutions and are capable of spending proportionately larger amounts of money.

B. Potential Risks

The risks come largely from funding unknown entities. The first question that arises is whether an ANGO has political objectives that it is trying to use reconstruction assistance to further. One might suspect that this is true of a number of Afghan entities but it can be enormously difficult to prove. Of course, it should be possible to draw a distinction between those who have political beliefs but are not trying to impose them on the population they are assisting, and those who see rehabilitation assistance primarily as a way to build political support. Most Afghans have some sort of political affiliation. This is a natural consequence of the long struggle and often a requirement for safety.

Some donors might suggest that even the existence of a political agenda does not matter. There are NGOs formed elsewhere in the world that are organized for the express purpose of supporting a political cause. These causes will interest some donors and not others. The same choices ultimately may have to be made in Afghanistan. Whose politics does a donor like? Would a donor prefer to support a group with a Maoist label, a Shura-i-Nizar-supported entity, a group with a fundamentalist label, or one with ties to a so-called moderate party? Currently, some donors try to avoid making such difficult decisions by scattering their funds, making sure groups with all sorts of affiliations receive funding. This may dilute the risk in a general sense, but it does not necessarily alleviate it in one small locality in which a politically-oriented group is working. It may be more effective as a strategy in areas where a substantial numbers of NGOs compete, but it may also place stress on the fragile peace maintained in some localities by providing resources that fuel competition.

Some donors, such as UNDP, say that they do not care what the political affiliation of a group is as long as it proves during implementation that it has been impartial in the selection of beneficiaries. Others are more cautious and rely on preliminary checking to identify NGOs with ulterior or incompatible motives.

With the reduction of military assistance, rehabilitation assistance is now more often sought by commanders and parties who need the funds to fuel their quest for dominance. Funding groups linked to commanders and parties raises the potential risk of fueling continued intra-resistance conflict and perhaps helping some commanders to oppose a new government in Kabul in the future. It certainly does not help enlarge the voice of civil society.

Another issue that arises is whether a group is benefitting its own kin and clan in the distribution of donor resources, and strengthening its family's prestige and position. Many Afghan entities are working in or near the home areas of their senior staff. It is often in these areas that they have the connections to work. ANGOs can probably ensure greater safety of goods and personnel in such areas because they have the protection of their family and clansmen. On the other hand, they are under tremendous pressure to benefit only kin. There are a few family-run NGOs, and they may be particularly susceptible to using assistance to improve the position and prestige of their family and clan. A number of ANGOs said that their field staff hate working in their home areas because of these pressures. At the same time, field staff can be more vulnerable in areas where they are not known, because no one may have a strong interest in protecting them.

The third question that arises when funding unknown groups is that of corruption. Some INGOs, of course, have had serious problems with internal loss of funds or collusion of staff with theft of resources inside Afghanistan. There is bound to be some leakage from all organizations. It may not be something the organization itself sanctions but making a little money on the side is something in which many employees engage. The opportunities for corruption are greater in the Afghan environment where groups are trying to manage over long distances with poor communications.

A recent UNDP evaluation points out, though, that donors do no better funding many developing country governments. Corruption inside governments may be rampant and it is certainly harder to track what happens to the money. Wastage of resources is also a problem, because the amounts received are often so large that they may be well beyond absorptive capacity. Wastage is not currently a problem with Afghan entities which are kept on very short funding cycles, except in the sense that donors have to pay overhead costs such as office rents, utilities, and computers for a number of ANGOs. In addition, it is very difficult, or impossible, to improve government performance. ANGOs have an incentive to improve. If they do not, they may not stay in business.

III. DONOR FUNDING OF AFGHAN NGOS

A. Interest and Criteria

In 1990, UNOCA called for the formation of additional Afghan implementing agencies to work cross-border. In 1989, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) had provided some of the first funding for Afghan NGOs for cross-border activities, concentrating on areas with high refugee outflows. This funding stopped as a host of other UN agencies became active. Since it seemed clear that new, weak, and largely unknown Afghan entities could not handle large sums of money, the UN agencies have given only small grants, divided into tranches, for short periods of time to Afghan organizations. This limited the potential loss of funds through incompetence, risks of war, or malfeasance, but it meant that a large number of partners was required. Since each implementing partner could only acquire limited funding, it could not invest in expanding its staff to any considerable extent. It sometimes made more sense for two engineers looking for a job to form their own NGO, rather than try to get hired by one of the existing ANGOs. There is at least one family that has two ANGOs, because it doubles their chances of obtaining funding. Joining the two staffs might make for a better, more effective institution, but it would limit the resources to which the staff has access.

There are other reasons for supporting a large number of Afghan groups. One is that dividing funds between groups whose staffs have ties to different parts of the country permits greater coverage of Afghanistan. Some ANGO directors are from Farah and would like to help their home area, whereas very few international NGOs have any interest in a province that is so difficult to reach. Another reason, discussed elsewhere in this paper, is that donors believe that scattering the money reduces the risk of political impact. Finally, the risk to the donor itself may be minimized if it funds many groups, with all shades of political complexion, so that no one political party becomes vindictive as a result of its ANGO's exclusion from donor largesse.

Those donors that have funded the largest number of NGOs include Canada Fund, which provides approximately $1 million per year, and some of the UN agencies. Canada Fund is willing to give an Afghan group its first grant and appears to have no formal criteria. It has a special interest in women's programs.

Roughly half of the 52 NGOs which UNDP had funded as of October 1991 were Afghan NGOs. Approximately 21 percent of UNDP's budget (around $2 million) was awarded to these Afghan organizations through 66 projects or contracts. Some ANGOs supported by UNDP have been awarded six or seven contracts. At this time, UNDP is increasing its funding for ANGOs, as these groups become better established and UNDP gains experience with them. In the six months

between April and September 1991, 33 of the 50 contracts awarded were signed with ANGOs. In addition to funding established groups, UNDP has created two community-based groups in Afghanistan to undertake work on sections of the road to Bamiyan that UNDP is funding.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has worked with 45 NGOs, about 22 of which have been Afghan groups. FAO mostly gives grains, seed and fertilizer to NGOs for distribution in Afghanistan, with UNDP supporting handling and distribution costs. The World Food Program (WFP) gives wheat for cash-for-work and food-for-work activities, the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) has funded groups to establish schools, the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) has funded health training, and the World Health Organization (WHO) has funded the construction of clinics.

UNDP and FAO have a policy of giving a first-time ANGO the benefit of the doubt. They check only on the technical capability of an organization seeking funding, and will consider a proposal if it addresses a need in a part of the country they wish to reach. UNDP says that it tried to ask about groups when it first started granting funds, but it received so many divergent opinions that it found checking useless. Therefore, neither FAO or UNDP appears to do any serious checking of an agency prior to working with it for the first time. UNDP senior staff are willing to give a small initial grant in order to produce a track record that can be assessed in the field. FAO will also make a first grant, unless what it hears about an organization is especially negative. UNDP tries to send a monitor to the site before it agrees to fund an activity but only succeeds in doing this in about 50 percent of the cases. FAO assumes that little damage can be done through grants of seed and fertilizer. If the inputs get past the border, they are bound to end up in the hands of farmers. Even if there is theft or some political objective that is being served, the seed and fertilizer will still end up with farmers somewhere. Neither cares particularly if a group has political attachments, as long as it works impartially in the field.

While these are practical policies for donors making a large number of awards to many different groups, the problem is that once a group has obtained UN funding, it gains a certain credibility and finds it easier to obtain funding from bilateral agencies and other UN donors. The ease of obtaining UN funding and the simplicity of its proposal formats mean that ANGOs are most interested in submitting proposals to these agencies.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the GOP created (and USAID continues to sustain) what may eventually be the largest ANGO, the Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU), with a US contractor on site to supervise

and guide its work. USAID has also considered establishing Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) operations, which are almost entirely Afghan-managed and staffed, as an Afghan NGO, but is not proceeding with this at the moment. USAID has also funded the International Rescue Committee's Rural Assistance Program (IRC/RAP), which awards grants to both international and Afghan NGOs. IRC's RAP office has funded five ANGOs to date, and the groups it is most pleased with have received multiple grants. More ANGOs are currently under consideration for funding, but the 1991 ban on USAID assistance being used cross-border slowed momentum.

The Norwegian Refugee Council and Norwegian Church Aid (NRC/NCA) also have an interest in supporting Afghan NGOs but have moved cautiously. They are more likely to approach groups to work with them than to encourage receipt of proposals. They concentrate on a few groups and try to provide assistance that would help these organizations strengthen their capacity as well as funding for activities. They are more willing to provide program support, whereas the UN agencies in particular want only to pay for activities or project support. The Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) allocated Rs. 3 million for cross-border ANGOs in 1991 and hopes to have Rs. 4 million in 1992. This is a small amount of money so they will probably concentrate on the few Afghan NGOs which work in NAC areas of interest and with which NAC is comfortable.

IRC/RAP, NAC and NRC/NCA do considerable informal checking about a group being considered for funding, until a consensus emerges as to what that group really represents. Neither NAC nor NRC/NCA has formal criteria but they will not fund a group which they do not know very well. In some cases, they knew the principal staff of the ANGOs they fund prior to the ANGOs being formed. Possessing a strong sense of what a group is and how it works must help with a decision about whether to fund that group as well as how to structure a grant. IRC/RAP has perhaps the most carefully considered criteria, which it is prepared to treat flexibly, particularly if an NGO requests funding for activities targeting women, minorities, or under-served parts of the country. IRC/RAP will not fund any organization until it has a track record in Afghanistan that can be verified.

There are numerous other small donors, such as Help (Germany), INDOORS, Help the Afghans Foundation, the Canada Fund, the Dutch Committee, and Oxfam. Some of these concentrate on funding ANGOs working with refugees.

To date, Arab donors have given only very limited funding to ANGOs. They often prefer to implement activities through commanders and are inclined to view the creation of civilian intermediaries (shuras, ANGOs) as deliberate efforts by the West to weaken commanders and therefore the Jihad. Many do not see ANGOs as

committed to or involved in the Jihad and seem suspicious of the intentions of ANGOs. Some ANGOs have obtained Arab funding, but these tend to be ones with strong links to commanders or political parties.

Some ANGOs suggest that there is some rivalry between UN and Western donors in supporting particular groups. At least one group felt that it had obtained funding from one donor because it was seen as the creature of another donor. Other ANGOs complained that the Afghan staff of donors often had biases and their own agendas and that sometimes those staff made access to the donor difficult or impossible. There should be more coordination between donors to share the support of those ANGOs they find responsible.

B. Donor Priorities

Most donors respond to requests for funding for particular activities from NGOs. Few have overall plans that would permit them to seek out competent NGOs and ask them to undertake a portion of the work, an approach which would involve treating NGOs as consulting firms or contractors. Almost all either have strong sectoral interests or the kind of support that they can provide (i.e., WFP wheat) limits the sort of activities that can be supported and sometimes where they can be supported. Almost all donors say that if they cannot monitor an activity, they will not consider funding it, although in practice it appears that many exceptions are made to this stated policy.

At the moment, donors do not seem to demand a community contribution toward activities they fund through NGOs, but there is movement in that direction. Donors probably should give priority to those groups capable of sustaining high levels of community involvement in their efforts. This was common before the war. Villagers typically contributed locally-available materials and labor.

C. Proposal Requirements

There is no standardization of proposal formats. Donors require different amounts of information, arranged in different order. All want proposals in English. In order to fund Afghan implementing partners, UNDP has been obliged to change its project document format and has developed simplified formats, with fill-in-the-blank answers. Almost no narrative explanation is required, reducing the burden on those few staff in an ANGO who have strong English language competence. However, the proposal formats also require little thought from the ANGOs completing them. UNDP believes that the ability to put together a good proposal has little to do with a group's ability to implement the proposal.

IRC has the most complex proposal format. It requires more technical and socio-political information than does UNDP, which supports similar activities. At the same time, however, it is also willing to make larger grants, with a $50,000 ceiling for a first-time IRC award. Most UNDP grants are substantially less than $50,000. Repeat IRC grants can be larger than $50,000 if the NGO has performed to IRC's satisfaction the first time. IRC staff note that the proposal format takes a group through a planning process and requires it to think about what it is trying to do and how it will do it. Many ANGOs, however, do not want to apply for IRC grants because of the work involved in developing the proposal, and the stress the proposal format puts on limited English language capabilities. Some ANGOs indicated that it can cost them more to develop the proposal than the value of the work is worth.

Because ANGOs require multiple grants to survive and they must try to arrange sequential grants, most ANGOs have no choice but to devote a major portion of senior staff time to proposal development. The Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan (RAFA) prepared roughly 68 proposals in 1991, Pamir Reconstruction Bureau (PRB) has submitted around 60 to UNDP alone, Khorasan Assistance Group (KAG) had prepared around 40 by November of 1991, and Agriculture Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (ARA) around 36. Other groups have prepared between 20 and 30 proposals.

ANGOs may also develop many proposals because they do not have a very good understanding of donors and how they operate. They often say that they do not understand why their proposals are rejected. On the other hand, several donors interviewed indicated that their staff take great pains to review proposals with NGOs.

Donors often seem to lack clear priorities, making it harder for ANGOs to determine what donor interests really are. Some of the more sophisticated ANGOs try to discuss an idea with a particular donor prior to developing a proposal. If the donor appears interested, the group proceeds with its design work. Some donors, such as UNDP and IRC/RAP, give potential grantees help in technical and other aspects of design and proposal formulation. This help can be very substantial, but it cannot be made available to all groups for all proposals.

Donors require proposals in English. This is difficult for many groups, although most donors say that weaknesses in grammar are never the reason a proposal is turned down. There is, however, a level of English language competence below which a proposal cannot be understood, and this must adversely affect the chances for funding. Because of this, and because some ANGOs have inadequate technical capabilities, there is a certain amount of helpful collaboration between groups. One group will lend another its computer and computer operator. A group may edit the English or advise on the technical contents of another ANGO's proposal.

There are also some less helpful developments. There is at least one small business in Peshawar producing proposals for groups that can pay in the neighborhood of Rs. 10,000 per proposal. Some weaker ANGOs have also persuaded stronger groups to write proposals for them, and these proposals are then submitted in the name of the weaker group. Some ANGO directors have indicated that they have turned down such requests. There also appears to be a certain amount of proposal theft. One group will obtain the proposal of another group, change the name, and submit that proposal to a donor.

A serious problem for ANGOs is that no donor will cover their survey and proposal development costs. When numerous proposals are being prepared, the costs of obtaining contracts escalate. Funds which the donors are prepared to allocate for overhead costs do not generally cover survey and design costs, particularly for physical infrastructure rehabilitation. There are occasional exceptions to this. FAO sometimes pays for the surveying costs and supervises the design of the structure for irrigation rehabilitation work that it funds. NRC/NCA recently funded the Afghan Development Association (ADA) to do a survey in five districts in South/Southwest Afghanistan and is now considering funding the proposal that evolved from this survey. Approaches such as this are unfortunately rare. Donors should consider covering at least a portion of the survey costs for proposals that they fund. Doing so might lead to more accurate data and better planning.

D. Delays in the Arrival of Funding

The time it takes for a UN agency to review a proposal, approve it, and then transfer funds is something about which all ANGOs complain. Part of the time lag is due to the large number of proposals received, part results from the need to make revisions (and in some cases revisions require another trip to the field site), and part is due to those bureaucratic procedures that plague any large organization. For example, ANGOs often suffer from long delays between the approval of a contract and the deposit of funds into their bank accounts.

Funding for any one contract is often divided into tranches, and the second and third tranche may not arrive on schedule, severely hampering the ability of the NGO to continue with field work. ANGOs, in particular, suffer from periodic and severe cash-flow problems because of the short-term nature of grants. They do not have their own resources to fill gaps in funding. Such delays can mean that staff need to be let go, the telephone gets cut off, and sometimes the appropriate season for the work is missed.
ANGO directors note that they invest considerable staff time and effort in survey, design and proposal preparation. By the time they receive the money, political circumstances in the area may have

changed and prevent the group doing the work, or the karez has deteriorated to such an extent that the rehabilitation can no longer be performed for the cost estimated. The time lag also causes communities to become skeptical of the intentions of the NGO. One source noted that the longer they spend surveying a karez, the greater the expectations of the community that the ANGO will undertake the work and that they may not be able to return to the community unless they have cash in hand.

E. Administrative and Overhead Costs

Donors are generally conservative with funding for overhead and administrative costs for their NGO partners. This stinginess does not trouble the INGOs too much, because they usually have overhead support from their home country and head office. This is not true for Afghan NGOs, who have no means of generating their own resources. ANGOs receiving UN funds complain about the very limited funding permitted for a group's overhead costs. FAO and WFP give commodities, and provide no coverage of overhead costs. UNDP allows up to 10 percent of the value of a contract for a group's administrative costs. Given the small size of most of these grants to begin with, it not surprising that ANGOs must struggle to stay in business. They survive only by obtaining multiple grants through forced expansion into sectors in which they may have little or no interest or capability.

One reason for limited support of administrative and overhead costs is that UN agencies and other donors do not want to encourage large Pakistan-based offices for the cross-border groups. A number of donors indicated that the first proposals they received from ANGOs appeared questionably heavy with staff and overhead costs. Paradoxically, the better staffed and equipped the Peshawar or Quetta office, the more competent the group may look to a donor.

Limited payment of overhead expenses makes it impossible for groups to invest in improving their organizations. ANGOs cannot do much planning or budgeting, and they often have no idea what their financial situation will be in two months' time. It also means that it can be difficult to hire qualified staff, because ANGOs may not be in a position to offer one year contracts.

A few donors have made grants to particular ANGOs, precisely to cover administrative costs. UNOCA in 1990 and early 1991 paid some salaries for a number of ANGOs for limited periods of three to six months. NCA/NRC has given short-term funding to ANGOs facing a sudden money-crunch.

IRC/RAP is one of the more generous donors in its willingness to cover overhead expenses. It allows up to 17 percent of the total contract for headquarters' overhead costs, another 17 percent for

operational costs (mostly spent in Afghanistan - transport, field office costs, etc), and a minimum of 66 percent on direct program costs. While 17 percent for overhead costs seems reasonable for rehabilitation projects, IRC's 17 percent actually covers a portion of the overhead costs that should be born by an ANGO's other donors, since other donors provide substantially less than this.

The way in which overheads are currently configured does not encourage an organization to incorporate community contributions. If the community contributes 25 percent of the cost of an activity, then the total amount needed by the ANGO for program costs would be less, and its overhead fee would be correspondingly reduced. In order to encourage higher community contributions, donors should agree to pay overhead on the entire cost of the activity, including what the ANGO pays and what the community contributes. Special financial incentives should be built into donor funding criteria to encourage maximum local contributions.

F. Supervision of ANGO Design and Implementation

Most donors have technical staff which can review designs and help improve them. Few have the capacity to actually supervise field implementation. FAO has done some supervision on irrigation rehabilitation. As indicated above, it pays the survey costs, supervises the design effort, purchases commodities (cement, sand, etc.) to ensure proper quality of materials and controls implementation. FAO is only able to do this, however, in areas close to Peshawar. In this sense, it treats ANGOs more like contractors than voluntary agencies. Some donors and INGOs have used some of the stronger engineering groups to review proposals and conduct surveys for them, using them more as consulting firms.

G. Reporting

Reporting is almost as problematic for ANGOs as proposal preparation. Donors have different reporting requirements. Most want quarterly and project completion reports. An ANGO lucky enough to have multiple donors must prepare many reports, even for very small scale activities. Again, the preparation of reports puts a tremendous burden on the few competent writers of English in an ANGO.

There are other problems with reporting from which both ANGOs and INGOs also suffer. Pakistan-based NGO staff often do not receive field reports on time, and many field staff are not competent report writers. UNDP, in fact, indicated that the best ANGOs it funded wrote better reports than many INGOs it had funded, and that some of the worst reporting was received from some of the largest INGOs.

H. Coordination

Most donors try to ensure that NGOs working in the same area collaborate. A portion of IRC's proposal format requires the applicant to indicate what it is doing to coordinate its efforts with other NGOs in the project area and how it plans to prevent duplication. FAO has met with groups working in the same district and helped them sort out which group was going to cover which villages. UNDP hopes to encourage a degree of coordination among the large number of NGOs wishing to work in Khost. There is a strong need for more of this sort of donor-enjoined collaboration in setting standards for groups working in the same area, in ensuring that there is not duplication, and in generally trying to reduce the amount of competition. Only funding agencies are in a position to bring about more than face-saving coordination. At a minimum level, donor consortia can help their grantees divide up the terrain. They should go beyond this to establish salary and technical standards.

I. Monitoring

The degree to which donors try to monitor differs. USAID started its own direct monitoring in autumn 1991. Previously it relied on the monitoring of its contractors and grantees. UNDP finally obtained permission from its New York headquarters to hire monitors this year. UNDP now has eight monitors, all with professional training. It tries to send these monitors to the project site before, during and after implementation. It succeeds in sending monitors to a site prior to grant approval only for about 50 percent of the contracts that it approves. UNDP regards its monitors as teachers more than policemen and asks them to help solve field problems, not just report on them. Sometimes expatriate missions are also sent to help monitor.

The Canada Fund employs four monitors who have been responsible for overseeing work on sixty projects in the last two years. IRC's RAP office has a monitoring unit headed by an expatriate. The unit employs six Afghan monitors, most of whom are university graduates. It tries to monitor every RAP-funded project once, generally toward the end of implementation, but it is not able to visit sites prior to approval of a proposal to determine the validity of the information presented.

Monitoring is, of course, extremely difficult, and Afghan monitors come under serious pressure. In many instances, monitors retain their integrity and do essential reporting, but there are also cases of monitors giving into pressures or extra-legal inducements. The larger the number of grantees, the harder it is to arrange adequate monitoring and track what these groups are doing.

IV. REGISTRATION PROCESSES FOR ANGOS

The purpose of any NGO registration process is to establish that a group has met certain standards. Registration thus conveys some amount of legitimacy.

Most ANGOs were formed by refugees in Pakistan and thus operate from a base in Pakistan. Some were formed cross-border but have found it necessary to establish an office in Pakistan in order to have access to donors.

ANGOs have no legal status in the eyes of the Government of Pakistan. This limits their formal accountability to donors and partly donors' reluctance to award large grants for long periods of time. Of course, in the instance of cross-border activities, the problem may be less one of pursuing defaulters through various courts of law than of discovering the default to begin with. Registration processes that some donors and ANGOs have looked to as a way of gaining legitimacy are discussed below.

A. No Objection Certificates (NOC)

There seem to be four reasons why ANGOs apply for NOCs. The first is that an NOC conveys an aura of legitimacy, which gives groups greater access to donor funds. The second is that without an NOC, an ANGO cannot gain tax exemptions on imported equipment or goods. The third is that in theory, without an NOC, an ANGO could be asked by the GOP to close down its operations in Pakistan. Finally, an NOC is requested by some donors. For some, having an NOC makes it easier to move goods; others think that an NOC is irrelevant for this purpose, perhaps because they are taking greater advantage of informal networks. Possessing an NOC may offer ANGOs some protection from various subtle pressures that might be brought to bear on them by GOP bodies. Alternatively, some ANGOs expressed concern that having an NOC would bring more attention to bear on them and perhaps subject them to greater pressure.

Many Afghans undertake charitable work with refugees and never bother to apply for an NOC. Their day-to-day work does not appear to be hampered by the lack of this document. For those groups working with refugees <u>in the camps</u>, an NOC may be useful because of the direct authority the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees exercises in the camps. Many of the oldest ANGOs formed to work with refugees obtained NOCs several years ago. At that time, it was relatively easy to obtain an NOC, since the Government of Pakistan was eager for external assistance to diminish the burden it carried for the care of refugees. It has become much more difficult with the passage of time to obtain NOCs.

To obtain an NOC, an ANGO first applies to the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees. It must supply detailed information about its purpose, its work, the staff, and its funding. It must present a sponsorship certificate signed by another NGO, either international or Afghan but one that has an NOC and is known to be a responsible group. It must also have approval from the AIG and submit a pro forma indicating this approval signed by the AIG. The Commissionerate investigates the applicant and then sends all the application forms to the Home Department, which appears to carry out the bulk of the investigation. Even if the Commissionerate does not believe a group should be awarded an NOC, it will follow the formalities and send the papers to the Home Department. The application materials then are sent to the Ministry for States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), with or without a letter indicating that the Commissionerate in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) or Balochistan has no objection to the organization operating. SAFRON then reviews the files in accord with GOP priorities.

The Commissionerate's office in Peshawar noted that there has been a substantial increase in the number of applications for NOCs filed by Afghan groups. Most of the ANGOs consulted in this study had applied in 1990 or 1991 for an NOC, usually in response to donor requests. Most seem to have gained the non-objection letter from the Commissionerate, but most were still waiting for SAFRON's NOC. Some ANGOs say that they are content with letters from the Commissionerate stating that body's non-objection to the NGO operating. They believe that for groups based in NWFP, the Commissionerate's letter is enough to protect them. Some ANGOs have obtained SAFRON NOCs, but it appears that the majority are waiting for one. A few ANGOs have been reluctant to apply because they prefer not to call attention to themselves. This is not because they are necessarily engaged in illicit activities but due to fear of interference.

The length of time it takes ANGOs to receive SAFRON's NOC varies considerably - for example, fifteen days for a group that had help from the AIG's Ministry for Reconstruction; four months for an NGO that has strong links to the Shur-e-Nizar; one year for an ANGO whose managing director has Hizb-i-Islami support; and over two years for groups that have negligible, weak or the wrong political connections. Some groups have been waiting for four years. The award of the NOC seems to have little to do with the credibility of the group applying. Commissionerate staff indicated that they were more interested in groups working in Pakistan and especially in the camps. They indicated that they were substantially less concerned about the legitimacy of groups working only cross-border. SAFRON, of course, may take a broader view.

Commissionerate staff in Peshawar indicated that in the past NOCs have been denied. In practice, this seems fairly rare. A more common method of handling a group to which the GOP does not really

want to give an NOC would be to 'sit' on the application file. The NOC is neither granted nor formally rejected. An NOC can also be revoked. This does not seem to have happened. It would be more likely that the GOP would make it difficult for the group to continue to operate in Pakistan. For example, for those groups working in the camps, the GOP could deny entry to the camps. The Commissionerate has also warned donors when it felt that groups were misusing funds.

Once an NGO receives an NOC, it must, if it is working with refugees, report monthly to the Commissionerate on its activities and its staff. The Commissionerate continues to keep an eye on the operations of groups after they are awarded an NOC.

It is not clear that the award of an NOC to an NGO offers much real protection to donors. An NOC may convey greater legitimacy in the case of NGOs working with refugees. For one thing, it is easier to investigate groups that work only or primarily with refugees. With an NOC, a donor has some assurance that the new recipient of a grant will not be asked to close its doors the day after the award is made. Knowing that a group has been approved by the GOP to operate in Pakistan is not unimportant. Even with that approval, NOCs do not make ANGOs legal entities in the eyes of Pakistani law. ANGOs cannot pursue legal action in the courts, nor can they be sued as organizations, though in theory their officers may be held individually accountable.

The issue of duty and tax exemption is less important now but will grow for those organizations that are able to expand and increase their donor funding. This exemption issue is of concern to donors as well, because they do not want their funds to be spent paying GOP import duties, which can be very high. One ANGO indicated that it had had imported equipment stuck at the airport for five months. Without an NOC, the ANGO would be obliged to pay the import duty on the equipment, something it could not afford. Therefore, they were waiting for their NOC, a prerequisite for obtaining a tax exemption for the goods.

To obtain a tax exemption, a group that has an NOC then applies to the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees and requests an exemption for particular goods. In other words, no general exemption is granted. Applications are made on an item by item basis. The Commissionerate, if it approves, sends the request to SAFRON, which ultimately grants or denies the exemption.

B. Registration as Legal Entities*

Currently, if an ANGO defaults on a contract with a donor, either through intent or by accident, that donor cannot prosecute the ANGO in a court of law, but it can register a case against the individuals who signed the contract. If those individuals disappear into Afghanistan, the donor has no recourse. Some donors have therefore examined two different registration procedures which might give ANGOs legal accountability: the Societies Registration Act of 1860 and the Companies Ordinance of 1984.

The first, the Societies Registration Act of 1860, registers charitable and educational groups. It requires that the organization 1) have regulations that spell out how it is governed (a charter); 2) hold an annual general meeting; and 3) present a list of the names of its governing body. The registration process is very brief - 7 to 10 days - and inexpensive, because no investigations of the group are made. It would not be difficult for ANGOs to go through this process. The registration is a pure formality that serves to make the organization a legal entity. No donor currently requires such a registration and no ANGO interviewed has obtained one. It could be worth donors asking for this registration in the event that they are considering an award for a very large sum of money. The current small awards to ANGOs do not require this sort of registration because it would be too costly and time-consuming to pursue a court case.

The second option is registration under the Companies Ordinance of 1984, which also registers non-profit organizations. This is a stricter, more expensive and time-consuming registration process, requiring detailed information about the group and an annual examination of the accounts by the Registrar, Joint Stock Companies. Pakistani companies go through the process in part because it is required to qualify for bank loans. This more difficult registration procedure probably does not ensure greater accountability than the Societies Registration Act, and it is not currently affordable for the vast majority of ANGOs. It would also give the GOP greater control over their operations.

Such registration procedures offer no advantages to ANGOs, who are unlikely to sue a donor and who want to maintain their distance from GOP bureaucracies. They would benefit a donor only if that donor were willing to pursue a lawsuit against an NGO.

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*Information in this section was drawn from a paper written for UNDP by Nasir-ul-Mulk and Sajida Shah, "Report on Legal Status of Afghan NGOs," in 1990.

C. UNOCA Registration

UNOCA began registering Afghan NGOs in March 1990. The requirements for registration include an organizational charter, a board of directors with multi-party representation (resumes of the members must be presented), a list of staff members along with their resumes, a list of the group's priorities/objectives, and a budget statement that shows the sources of funds and how those funds are used. The process of registration takes three to four months and during the review, applications are considered by the joint UN Agencies Technical Committee and Steering Committee. UNOCA estimates that roughly five to eight ANGOs have been denied registration, mostly due to improprieties in constituting their boards of directors. As of November 1991, fifty-five ANGOs were registered, and many applications - perhaps thirty to forty - were pending. UNOCA does not ask for regular reports about the organization's activities once the group is registered, but it does ask for notification when there are changes in the board of directors or in those districts where the group works.

There are many misconceptions about the advantages of UNOCA funding in the ANGO community. While UNOCA staff try to explain that registration does not guarantee funding, many ANGOs felt that once they were registered they would start receiving UN funds.

In some ways, UNOCA has established not a registration process but a clearing house for information about ANGOs. The registration does not convey legitimacy. UNOCA registration is not even a pre-condition for UN funding. The registration is never revoked, even should UN agencies, after gaining experience with a group, have reason to believe that it should be.

While it would have been very useful had UNOCA been able to establish a strict registration process that conveyed some legitimacy, this perhaps was beyond its mandate. UNOCA perhaps could have exercised a little more discretion than it did. Unfortunately, UNOCA has registered as NGOs (and other donors have funded) groups that are not NGOs but which are attached to one commander or a part of a political party, the GOP, and/or the AIG. In some cases, UNOCA officials appear to have asked groups to make cosmetic changes, such as changing the NGO's name or expanding target regions to appear less political. This attitude of convenience muddies the water and makes it more difficult to sort out which groups might actually be NGOs.

D. Other Options for Increasing Accountability

When planning to award a large contract, or even a relatively small contract to a new group, the donor could ask the ANGO to find a guarantor in either the INGO or ANGO community. Some NGOs

indicated to Mr. Nasir-ul-Mulk, a barrister who examined issues related to ANGO legal status in Pakistan for UNDP, that they would be willing to act as a guarantor if they had some confidence in the ANGO requiring the guarantee. This feeling could encourage joint ventures through which stronger ANGOs or INGOs could support and provide assistance to weaker ANGOs.

The other option for acquiring greater legal accountability, also pointed out by Mr. Nasir-ul-Mulk in his UNDP report, would be to insist that all ANGO senior staff sign a contract with the donor, particularly if the donor knows that some of those staff are unlikely to leave Pakistan.

There currently is no way to establish legal accountability for groups based only in Afghanistan. For this reason, some donors insist that an NGO have a permanent representative or office in Pakistan as a pre-condition for funding.

V. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ANGOS

A. Types of Organizations

Many ANGOs are trying to work in too many sectors, with very little depth in any one sector. One reason for doing so is to increase chances of receiving donor funding from sources with different interests. UNESCO funds schools, WHO clinics, UNICEF health training, UNDP irrigation system repair and veterinary services, FAO seed distribution, and none of these agencies wants to give too much money to any single group. An engineering ANGO might decide to distribute wheat seed and fertilizer because these items are available from FAO. The same group might subsequently think of providing veterinary services when it learns that such services are of keen interest to UNDP. Another reason ANGOs try to work in multiple sectors is that they come under strong pressure from communities to meet a variety of needs. This is especially likely in the case of community-based NGOs.

Working in many different sectors substantially increases demands on ANGO management, particularly for groups that do not have one strong regional base but work in different provinces. Most ANGOs at this point are inherently weak because they are young organizations with limited and intermittent funding. They tax their capabilities seriously by trying to work in too many sectors, developing programs in several sectors simultaneously or expanding into sectors in which they have no comparative advantage. To the extent that Afghan agencies do a poor job in managing activities that are donor funded, they hurt their chances for renewed funding. More specialization in both geographic area and sector would probably be desirable, but it is not a successful short-term strategy. It could, however, be a more effective long-term survival strategy. Groups that occupy a specialized niche might find it easier both to improve their competence in performing their specialty and in establishing a clearer identity in the minds of funding agencies.

It is difficult to design a matrix of ANGO types, since some ANGOs overlap two or more categories, but an attempt has been made to do so below.

1. Donor Creations and INGO Spin-Offs

There are a small number of ANGOs that either split off from INGOs or were deliberately set loose. These are attractive groups to most donors because of the experience they have had in Western-style organizations. They often have inherited management and administrative systems that may be more responsive to donor requirements. These organizations include the four UNOCA-supported de-mining/mine-awareness groups, Engineering Services for Afghan Relief (ESAR - once part of Shelter Now International), Helping

Afghan Farmers Organization (HAFO - Dutch Committee), Afghan Development Association (ADA - Salvation Army), Cultural and Relief Foundation for Afghanistan (CRFA - Afghan Cultural Assistance Foundation), Koh-i-noor Foundation (KF - Mercy Fund), Afghan Logistics and Construction Unit (ACLU - USAID-created), Mujahideen Medical Center (MMC - NAC), and Short Term Assistance for Rehabilitation (START - UNDP). ADA, ACLU and KF are still advised by expatriates. The de-mining agencies are only semi-autonomous, and some have suggested that greater centralization of efforts is needed. Some of these ANGOs, but not all, started life as independent entities with considerable funding by their parent agencies. Some continue to be heavily funded by their parent agencies or creators.

NCA and NRC, which are both donors and implementors, have for the last two years been preparing their 160-staff strong implementing wing, called the Norwegian Project Office (NPO), for a separate life as an ANGO. Staff are engaged in discussing what an Afghan NGO should be, what kind of support it should have in the community, how the group should structure itself, what it should be doing and where it should be working. Training in development studies and other aspects of work has also been a part of the preparation.

2. Commanders' NGOs

Commanders are forming their own NGOs. One of the earliest groups working cross-border in rehabilitation is Commander Amin Wardak's Afghanistan Center for Rural Development (ACRD), by most accounts a competent implementor. The South West Health Committee of Commander Ismail Khan is reportedly contemplating becoming an ANGO in order to attract UN funding. One example repeated by an ANGO is that after the ANGO refused to share funding obtained to clean two canals in an area with the local commander, the commander formed his own NGO and registered it with UNOCA. Now perhaps that commander will be able to obtain donor funds for rehabilitation, cementing his hold over his population and perhaps even keeping other ANGOs out. The researchers are aware of at least seven groups which are directly controlled by one and sometimes a few commanders. There are probably others.

3. ANGOs Linked to the Shura-e-Nizar

The Shura-e-Nizar is <u>sui generis</u> at this point in Afghan politics, so groups linked to it are discussed separately. The Health Committee of the Northern Provinces (HCNP), Consultants Bureau for Reconstruction (CBR), and PRB may be some of the most effective implementing partners around, precisely because they are supervised by the Shura and have the backing of Commander Ahmed Shah Masood. One might well question whether they are NGOs. They both benefit from this political strength and augment it by providing services.

PRB and the Reconstruction Committee of the Northern Provinces are essentially one and the same organization, and they continue to receive some Shura-e-Nizar funding. One might anticipate that they could over time become part of various ministries in the north and northeast, once a new central government is formed. If there is no acceptable central government or if the Shura cannot or does not want to be a part of it, then these groups will substitute for, or become, regional government ministries. The designation of NGO is essentially a fig-leaf created to permit UN funding.

4. ANGOs Linked to One Party

Groups with party ties are harder to define. The links may be strong and deeply felt or nominal. The stronger the ties, the more likely the party is to influence where and how the ANGO does business. One expatriate organization has been supporting a party affiliated health committee, and that health committee plans to become an ANGO, again to attract UN funding. At least one source familiar with that committee claims that the party is using the provision of health services in part to build its own power base. While the organization supporting this party committee finds it a responsible implementor with good accountability, it is conceivable that its support may be having a political consequence that it does not intend. Perhaps that consequence will be good for communities in the area, but perhaps it will not be. If donors are comfortable with the political views of these groups (providing it can figure those views out), then it may be acceptable to fund them, but donors and INGOs should not deceive themselves that their aid is neutral.

Several ANGOs are associated with parties reputed to be liberal or left-wing in ideology. These so-called Maoist groups have been largely discredited by events in Afghanistan and are viewed with suspicion by the majority of Afghans. Therefore, resurrection as an ANGO provides an opportunity to regain credibility and status in target areas inside Afghanistan.

5. Regional and Community-Based Groups

While NGOs in many countries grow out of a particular community in response to specific needs, most cross-border NGOs have been formed by Afghan technocrats living as refugees in Pakistan. They are therefore in the position, as Jane Thomas points out, of needing to work backwards to identify a community base and create support for themselves. There are, however, a few community-based groups, some of which are just emerging. Most of these groups do not have offices in Pakistan and they do not generally have strong technical competence. Still, they may be characterized by high levels of community activism and contribution. Those that fit the shura model may not have any formal organizational structure or serious technical ability. There are other groups, formed by individuals

with professional training but still resident in their communities, who are able to form solid organizations that have strong support from their communities.

Many of the community-based groups will find it hard to access external funding because of their lack of a Pakistan presence and because they may not speak any English. As the 1990 Holtzman-Herbison-Abdul Qayyum report on Afghan involvement in reconstruction programs points out, community-based groups will cost donors more time. It will be harder for donors to figure out who the staff are and what special interests they represent. There are some strong advantages in strengthening groups that can command high levels of community activism and that may be able to meet the continuing needs of their area, but the institutional support required may be beyond the ability of many donors to provide.

There are also ANGOs that intend to work in one or two neighboring districts or parts of a province. Their senior staff are usually from that area, and at least some have had professional training. Groups such as the Laghman Rehabilitation Organization (LRO) and Maruf Reconstruction Committee (MRC) belong in this category of regional groups. They may or may not start off as genuine community-based groups, but they may have a better chance of increasing their community support than the technocratic groups. This will depend on how impartial they can be in the distribution of aid. Family-based groups can also be placed in this category. There are a few NGOs which employ considerable staff from their own families. They may act first and foremost to benefit themselves.

6. Afghan Consulting Firms

These are what the Holtzman-Herbison-Abdul Qayyum report calls "professional-based" groups. Most ANGOs, especially those with headquarters in Pakistan, fit this model, although some also have party links of various kinds. They are formed by one or more Afghan refugee-professionals (mostly engineers), and they tend to work as contractors, willing to take on whatever work a donor requires. They vary in degree of technical competence and in size, but most of them have stronger technical capacity than the ANGOs linked to a home region. Most of them have at least one good English speaker, and they are often staffed by part-timers who work for INGOs during the week and the ANGO on the weekend. Their senior staff are all university graduates, some of whom may have advanced degrees from abroad. One risk with groups that work largely as contractors is that they may not understand the area very well. They may pick the wrong canal to rehabilitate and may be more likely to run afoul of local political dynamics.

7. Refugee-Based Groups

Many of these ANGOs, which were among the first to form, provide primarily curative health services of various kinds to refugees. They were formed by Afghan physicians who have shown tremendous persistence, commitment and courage, in the face of endless financial problems and risks linked to their high visibility. There are also groups that have opened schools and provide vocational training and assistance with income generating activities. Many have been effective advocates for the refugees. Despite several years of activity, the financial status of many of these groups continues to be precarious, in part because many insist upon providing free services.

8. Women's ANGOs

These are organizations that are run (at least in theory) by women and that target females as beneficiaries. Most of them are involved in female education, both for children and for adults (literacy, health education and usually sewing and handicrafts production). Most target refugees, because of limits on female mobility. Some offer handicrafts training primarily for middle class clients. At least three of the groups are new. The two biggest women's groups, Islamic Organization of Afghan Women (IOAW) and Muslim Sisters' Organization of Afghanistan (MSOA), are both party-linked and primarily run girls' schools. One of the two runs twenty-two schools in Afghanistan. The only other female-managed organization that appears to operate across the border is that of Dr. Sima Samar, who has opened schools, established an OPD clinic and is building a fifty-bed hospital in Jaghori, Ghazni.

Female-managed groups, in general, will have a difficult time operating cross-border until they can move the base of their operations inside Afghanistan. Those that try will probably only be able to work in their home areas, provided that these areas are close to Pakistan. It seems more realistic at this point to encourage women's groups to concentrate on more accessible refugee beneficiaries, to whom they can provide services directly. Their refugee clients represent a broad cross-section of Afghan females. It may never again be so easy to reach females from so many different parts of Afghanistan. Eventually, many of them will return home, taking new skills with them. Donors should encourage women's groups to learn to manage organizations by guiding and supporting refugee programs.

Activities targeting females are viewed by many ANGOs as risky due to the attitude of some of the fundamentalist parties. One Peshawar-based ANGO director said that if his group tried to initiate activities benefitting women, he felt they would be out of business in two weeks. Curiously, Quetta-based groups indicated a stronger interest in developing women's activities and more such

activities were either in the planning stage or underway. A number of Quetta-based groups indicated that once they had credibility in a community, they could begin slowly to initiate activities directed at women, but that they would have to begin in traditional subjects. In part, the interest that is apparent in Quetta is coming from Hazara groups. For cultural reasons, it may be easier for ANGOs working with the Shi'a community in the Hazarajat to include programming for women.

B. Organizational Structure

1. Charters and Boards of Directors

Charters and boards of directors are unfamiliar concepts, but they are required for UNOCA registration and by some donors for funding. Afghans forming NGOs are therefore quickly learning what is required in a charter and how to put together a board of directors that will pass muster. Virtually all the ANGO charters read alike, in part because existing charters are shared with new ANGOs, which copy the wording, changing the names as appropriate. Almost no group pays any attention to its charter once the charter is written. The document is a paper formality.

At the same time, most ANGOs have put together irrelevant boards of directors. Generally, it is the ANGO managing director and his closest associates who have selected the members of the board of directors. Sometimes the board has been chosen by a shura or meeting of community elders and local commanders, but this is rare. Usually, the director of the ANGO sits on the board, and often other ANGO employees do as well. In a few cases, the board consists of more than fifty per cent employees. The board of the HCNP is entirely composed of senior staff. The board of one Peshawar-based ANGO includes nine staff and four outsiders. Of the outsiders, one is the brother of the director and another works for the brother. Even when a board does not consist of employees and relatives, it seems that members are chosen on the basis of a close connection with the ANGO's director. Therefore, for cultural reasons, board members are perhaps unlikely to object or resign if they are unhappy with the way staff are managing the organization.

The same limited number of senior Peshawar technocrats sit on the boards of several Peshawar-based ANGOs, and they lend these groups some credibility. If all these ANGOs held board meetings, as laid out in their charters, these technocrats, who have work of their own, would be very busy people indeed. Fortunately for these technocrats, most boards do not meet with any regularity, and some never meet at all. This appears to be less because it is difficult to get a large number of people together than because ANGO directors are not really interested in advice or in letting outsiders meddle in their organizations.

Of course, in Europe and the US there are also NGOs whose boards of directors are rubber stamps. These boards may help with fundraising and making contacts with donor agencies, but they do not increase the accountability of the group because they do not play any serious role in management of the institution. Few if any ANGOs have boards which actively assist with fund-raising. There are a very few groups whose boards of directors are at all active. CBR is one such group. Its board meets periodically and members of the board with engineering expertise review designs and advise on proposals.

In sum, charters and boards mean little in terms of added accountability. While it might be a good idea for donors to continue to encourage ANGOs to form responsible boards and to take these boards seriously, it could take a long time before this encouragement bears any fruit. Donors would have to go beyond insisting on the formation of the board and would need to look at whether the board meets and whether it has the powers the ANGO's charter outlines for it.

2. Staffing

Most ANGOs are heavily dependent on the person at the top. Generally, ANGO directors have had good professional training, they often speak English quite well, and they are often impressive individuals. If they are out of town, however, there may be no one else in the organization with whom to talk. In a sense, they 'own' their NGO. There is one ANGO, for example, whose director fled abroad, following threats. He still controls the agency, but management over such a distance is not effective, and the ANGO has lost much of the direction and quality it might once have had. In a couple of other instances, family members have taken over as directors when the director was obliged to flee or was assassinated.

There appear to be between five and ten ANGOs that have staffs of over 100. The largest ANGO, which is linked to the Shura-e-Nizar, is the HCNP, which has around 3,000 staff. It is supported by Management Sciences for Health (MSH), a USAID contractor. The other large ANGOs are all predominantly engineering groups working on physical infrastructure construction or rehabilitation. ACLU, the second largest ANGO with over 800 staff, was set up by USAID and its US contractor Construction Control Services Corporation (CCSC). This ANGO is not independent at this point and, as it is entirely funded and very closely monitored by USAID, it seems to be in a different category than most ANGOs. Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) and the Southwest Afhganistan Agency for Demining (SWAAD), the two agencies which carry out physical demining, both have staffs of over 300. They are entirely supported by UNOCA. PRB and CBR also have staffs of over one hundred. Both are tied to the Shura-e-Nizar and have had support from the Shura-e-Nizar

in the past. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the largest and best staffed ANGOs are those with guaranteed sources of external support. They are also probably not fully autonomous at this point.

The majority of the ANGOs have between 10 and 50 staff, depending on how many contracts they are implementing at any given moment. Most of these smaller groups are thinly staffed with professional personnel, and most of these are drawn from the refugee community. UNDP noted that it had recently in the space of a few weeks seen the same engineer representing the engineering competence of four different ANGOs. Each time, the engineer alleged that he had quit his previous job. Many ANGOs have lost a number of their best qualified technocrats to emigration. Keeping technically qualified staff is also a genuine problem for some groups operating on a very thin margin. Many of the best qualified professionals will not accept jobs for less than one year, and few ANGOs are in a position to guarantee one year contracts. Some experienced professionals are reluctant to work in Afghanistan. Some ANGOs have also had to let staff go when they failed to obtain contracts on time or in the number they hoped. Turnover in staff creates management problems and makes it difficult for an organization to build its capability.

The sector that tends to be best staffed is that of engineering. This reflects in part the priority given to physical infrastructure reconstruction by donors. It also reflects the fact that the majority of groups are run by engineers, whose English language skills tend to be excellent, and who may prefer to hire their fellow engineers.

Few ANGOs have any serious depth in agriculture. Those that are among the best staffed with agriculturalists are ARA, HAFO, and Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR). The lack of capacity in agriculture is not a major problem as long as the main activity is seed and fertilizer distribution, but if interest in more complex agriculture programs grows, it may be a hindrance. Curiously, there is not a shortage of agriculturalists. ARA has a considerable number of agriculturalists trained to the MS and BS level working at its sites in Afghanistan, and many of these were identified locally at its project sites.

It is becoming clear that there is technical expertise still to be found in many rural areas of Afghanistan. It had been lost in the sense that NGOs did not know that there were still engineers, doctors, and other technically trained people who did not become refugees and who are interested in working in their home areas. UNDP is beginning to put more pressure on its grantees to identify and employ local professionals because it lowers reconstruction costs to employ local people and their incomes have a multiplier effect in the local economy. It also probably increases acceptance of NGO activities and improves the standard of work.

ANGOs differ in the balance between field staff and Pakistan-based staff. Some maintain substantial staff in Pakistan despite the low overheads that most donors are willing to pay. A number of ANGOs keep their best qualified staff in Pakistan or mostly in Pakistan, and only junior staff, with less training and experience, are permanently in the field. This can create serious management problems in the field and increase the risk of poor work. It can be much harder for junior staff to stand up to powerful figures in the community.

The groups with more and better qualified staff in a Pakistan headquarters office tend to look more capable to donors. Obviously, some qualified staff must remain in Pakistan to deal with donors and prepare proposals. Some groups are exceptional in that their senior staff, including the director, spend much or most of their time in Afghanistan, and they have staff with serious technical competence based permanently in the field. Such groups include Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA), CoAR, CBR, HCNP, ARA, PRB, and others.

Salaries are another issue affecting ANGO staffing. ANGOs claim that they cannot pay what the better-funded and longer-established INGOs pay. In order to compete for qualified staff, however, ANGOs cannot afford to pay much below market rates. The IRC/RAP accountant notes that European and Afghan NGOs pay salaries in the same range, while US NGOs and contractors often pay much more generously. By now, professional salaries have increased well beyond the point of what a future Afghan government will be able to afford. NGOs linked to the Shura-e-Nizar have complained that INGOs make it difficult to create sustainable administrative systems with stable staff by offering substantially better salaries to field staff than the Shura-e-Nizar can afford to pay.

3. Administrative and Financial Systems

These are weak areas for most ANGOs (also for many INGOs). Almost all groups have trouble with their financial management and record-keeping. Afghan accountants are in very short supply, and few are comfortable with double-entry bookkeeping. Some groups have resorted to hiring Pakistani accountants. The salaries that they are able to pay, however, do not necessarily command top Pakistani skills. A well-qualified Pakistani accountant earns Rs. 10,000 to 20,000 per month. A few relatively well funded groups pay their accountants around Rs. 10,000 per month, but that sum is well beyond what most groups can afford. Some groups do not have professional accountants but use engineers or others to handle financial management. When IRC recently held a workshop in accounting for 20 financial managers from INGOs and ANGOs, more than half the participants had had no professional training in accounting.

A major problem, as far as most donors are concerned, is control of field expenditures and proper reviewing of receipts that come in from the field. Some of these problems are due to the inexperience of field staff, some due to sloppiness, and some perhaps to the logistical difficulties of getting the thumb prints of each and every person paid for casual labor on a canal or road. Donors at this point appear to be relatively indulgent of accounting problems that appear to be due to inexperience and to problems inherent in trying to monitor expenditures over long distances with very poor communications.

No ANGO interviewed has sophisticated indirect cost accounting systems that allow them to figure out what their actual overhead costs are and to argue convincingly to donors that the latter ought to pay those charges. The notion of external audits is also a new one. Most ANGO charters that the researchers reviewed called for external audits, but not one group interviewed had had one conducted. Partly this is due to the expense of an external audit, which might cost Rs. 10,000. Partly it is due to the fact that donors review the financial records for the activities they fund. IRC's senior accountant spends about half his time giving technical assistance in setting up financial management systems and keeping accounts to NGOs that IRC is funding. The NCA/NRC and UNOCA accountants also give advice to certain ANGOs. A couple of INGOs have offered short-term training for accountants working for ANGOs.

Most ANGOs have one administrator, one secretary and, if they are lucky enough to own a computer, one person who functions as computer operator. There is little staff depth on the administrative side for most ANGOs, because donors are not willing to cover much in the way of overhead costs. Some of the larger ANGOs are able to afford personnel officers, transport supervisors, procurement officers and the like.

C. How ANGOs Implement Activities In Afghanistan

Most groups respond to requests from the communities with which they work or hope to work. They all hold extensive discussions with shuras, commanders and villagers. They check the technical and socio-economic feasibility of the requested activity and then make a decision about whether to prepare a proposal. Some ANGOs have conducted surveys of one or more districts to determine the priority reconstruction needs of those areas. Then they prepare proposals.

Very few groups give funding or implementation responsibility directly to shuras or commanders. Of course, some ANGOs are the clients or creations of one particular commander, and then the commander ultimately controls implementation. Most groups rely on shuras and/or commanders for security and, in a general sense, to approve the group's presence in an area. Several also rely on shuras, where they exist (sometimes they create shuras when those councils do not exist), to help select beneficiaries. Field staff can be helpful, though, in setting the terms or criteria for selection, so that the wealthiest and most powerful do not end up with the most desirable goods and services. Some ANGOs say that they have their field staff make such decisions, but those groups that do so are distributing wheat seed and fertilizer, not giving for free or selling on a subsidized basis tractors or animals. The higher the value of the item, the more competition there will be for it.

Community cost-sharing is a relatively new idea to all NGOs working in Afghanistan. Inputs and services used to be provided for free, because communities were seen as living in dire poverty. While most rural communities are poor, the degree of damage suffered differs from one part of the country to another. Most communities can contribute something, although the kind and amount of contribution they can make will differ. Development theory has long held that the more actively engaged a community is in an initiative to improve conditions and the more it contributes of its own resources, the better maintained and protected that investment will be. ACBAR has supported the idea of community contributions, and donors are now calling for this as well. Accordingly, the number of NGOs, both international and Afghan, that are now asking communities to contribute labor or local materials, or in some rare cases even funds, to reconstruction activities is growing.

NGOs are most likely to ask for contributions for irrigation system rehabilitation (privately owned goods) and agricultural inputs and machinery rental. It is difficult anywhere in the world to persuade communities to contribute to publicly-owned goods such as roads, except through taxes. A couple of NGOs have asked communities to share the cost of putting up schools. In Afghanistan before the war, government-provided education and health services were free, even though this policy prevented the spread of such facilities. Therefore Afghans now find it difficult to accept the idea of charging for these services. Some hospitals and clinics serving refugees do charge a small fee and are therefore able to cover some of their costs, reducing their dependence on donors. Some refugee clinics have said that their donors would not let them charge for services. The Shuhada Clinic in Quetta covers about 18 percent of its running costs from patient fees.

Asking for a community contribution is still not the policy of all groups. Some continue to say that communities they work with are too poor to help. There is also a certain amount of damaging competition. Instances of one NGO offering to work with a community on a cost-sharing basis, and another NGO (sometimes an INGO) coming along and offering the same activity at no cost to the community have happened. Obviously, the community will choose to work with the group which offers the better deal.

One problem with asking for a community contribution is community suspicion that the NGO has received the full cost of the activity from some donor and is charging the community only so that its staff can pocket the difference. This is partly the result of offering services and goods for free for so long. It is a reaction that is more likely to come from those communities that have received considerable assistance. Some ANGOs said they have dealt with such suspicions and that they can only be overcome once the group has completed activities and has credibility in an area.

Some ANGOs have been clever in devising ways in which they can help communities but also generate an income that would permit them to cover costs or undertake new work. One ANGO, Aryana Reconstruction Agency for Afghanistan (ARAA), has a few trucks it hires out in order to generate some income. ACRD in Wardak has a cereal bank a machinery workshop. CoAR rents tractors and threshers on an hourly basis and repairs farm machinery. ESAR has a pre-cast concrete factory in Paktya - it does not produce an income at this point but might in future. Generating an income, of course, usually requires funds for investment, and most ANGOs do not have such funds.

Almost all ANGOs start work in areas where their ties are strongest. The ties may be family and tribal connections or friends who have grown powerful - i.e., the former classmate who has become a commander or who has now succeeded his father as a tribal leader. As noted earlier, it is easier and safer to work in a community where someone with influence knows you and can vouch for you.

At the same time, working where there are family and clan connections may subject a group to considerable pressure to distribute goods and services on a preferential basis. These pressures must be balanced against the added vulnerability of working in areas where a group is completely unknown and has no one interested in protecting it. While it is undeniably useful for senior staff to have good contacts in the area in which the NGO is working, there is a debate as to whether it is better to employ technical field staff and supervisors who are local to the area or from outside the area. All groups, of course, hire unskilled and skilled labor locally. There are risks that local field staff, who have their own family and party loyalties, will subvert whatever

plans are made by senior staff. Supervision of staff over such long distances is notoriously difficult.

Some ANGOs are beginning to establish permanent field offices. This may be a useful development. Groups with a permanent presence in a particular area may be more likely to have a serious commitment to the people of that area. They will come to learn more about the communities with which they work, and there will be more serious monitoring of their efforts by those communities. They have much more to lose if their field staff are behaving improperly than those groups whose staff are in an area for a few weeks to clean a karez and then move to another province.

D. Monitoring

Because groups have difficulty covering their administrative costs, they usually cannot afford to have staff devoted only to monitoring of field activities. ADA is the only ANGO encountered in interviews that had two staff designated as full-time monitors. Most ANGOs rely on their headquarters staff to travel to project sites at periodic intervals to carry out monitoring. The farther the project site is from headquarters, the more difficult monitoring is. Some have access to radio networks. Some ANGO directors travel inside frequently to monitor activities and guide implementation. One group sends its field staff to visit one another's sites - this not only constitutes a form of monitoring but it helps build camaraderie. Many groups rely heavily on the donor to monitor their activities. While a stronger ability to monitor would be desirable in the view of almost all Afghan groups interviewed, until they have a means of covering administrative costs, they will have difficulty enhancing this capacity.

VI. Coordination

A. Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)

As of the date of this report, only 12 of the 65 ACBAR members are ANGOs. Two of these 12 are new members who were accepted at the November 1991 General Session, while two additional applications from ANGOs are pending. The membership criteria for ACBAR are fairly easy to fulfill: a willingness to explain where the group is working, what it is doing, and who is funding it; reporting activities to the ACBAR database; an application for an NOC from SAFRON pending or granted; and a recommendation from the Steering Committee. Most NGOs which are willing to share information about their work qualify for membership. The recommendation from the Steering Committee is probably most useful in weeding out applicants (INGOs as well as ANGOs) whose probity some have reason to doubt. The applicant would probably have to be extremely suspect. On the other hand, there is an argument for including such members. With open information sharing and a data base that reports on the village level, it perhaps becomes harder to pretend to clean fourteen karezes in an area where other members know that only four exist.

Why haven't more ANGOs joined ACBAR? One reason is that many groups are very new and no doubt have other priorities. Another is that ACBAR does not seem to have been very aggressive in seeking Afghan membership. Since some ANGOs do not have strong English language capabilities, it should not be assumed that they either know about ACBAR or have any clear sense of what ACBAR does. One ANGO, for example, never investigated membership because it was under the mistaken impression that the membership fees were about five times higher than they actually are.

High membership fees are in fact a reason that some ANGOs do not try to join. While ACBAR fees are set on a sliding scale based on a member's annual budget, the minimum fee of Rs. 1000 per month appears to be too high for many ANGOs. This may be particularly the case due to ACBAR's request for payment in annual or twice yearly installments. Because ANGOs are funded primarily with short-term, intermittent grants, it is possible that they might not have funds for membership at the time that the membership fee is due. One ANGO, START, applied and was accepted for ACBAR membership, but then did not join because it did not at that time have money to pay the fees.

In discussions with ACBAR's Managing Director, it became clear that ACBAR was prepared to be flexible about both the fees themselves and the scheduling of payment. As the director noted, cost should never be the single barrier to joining ACBAR. ANGOs, however, have the impression that the fees are fixed and payment schedule immutable. A more pro-active stance on the part of ACBAR senior

staff and Steering Committee members to promote ACBAR membership and overcome whatever obstacles ANGOs see to their becoming members could prove useful in drawing more ANGOs into ACBAR. Some donors have indicated a willingness to cover membership fees for coordinating agencies, but this willingness needs to be better advertised.

Language is perhaps another reason that ANGOs do not join. ACBAR is essentially an English-language forum. Some subcommittees (i.e., the veterinary subcommittee) work primarily in Dari. Most, however, operate in English, and relatively little translation appears to take place unless a field worker comes in to give a report. Minutes also appear in English, except for General Assembly minutes, and Dari translations are provided only upon request. Not all participants at any one meeting, of course, are comfortable with English. Translation takes time, and most participant would argue that ACBAR meetings are already too long. There is no easy solution to this, but probably subcommittee meetings should be conducted in the language in which the majority of participants feel they can communicate. There should be some attempt to ascertain this at the beginning of a meeting. It is in the interest of coordination and the expatriate assistance community, which disposes of the greatest funds, to hear as many Afghan voices and views as possible.

Many Afghans also see ACBAR as an expatriate forum, operating in a style that is foreign to them. They do not feel their views receive an adequate hearing, and some do not feel comfortable expressing themselves. Robert's Rules of Order may understandably confuse many participating in General Assembly sessions. One issue may be cultural. Westerners are perhaps more accustomed to making decisions at public meetings and have fewer problems voicing opposition, negotiating, or resolving conflict in such contexts. Afghans, like other Middle Easterners, are more likely to use intermediaries to negotiate and may be uncomfortable voicing disagreement in public. Of course, it depends on the individual and the seriousness of the issue involved.

Expatriates to a large extent appear to continue to dominate the monthly General Assembly meeting, and certainly take up more floor time than Afghans. There has, however, been a shift in participation in many of the subcommittee meetings. Over the last year, one ACBAR staffer suggests that Afghan attendance at subcommittee meetings has doubled. A majority of those now attending most ACBAR meetings are Afghans, most of whom at this point work for INGOs. This change from expatriate-dominated meetings to meetings where Afghans are in the majority reflects growing Afghanization of the INGOs.

Until quite recently, the chairmanships of ACBAR's various subcommittees tended to be held by expatriates. This has begun to

change. In addition, four of the nine ACBAR Steering Committee members are senior staff of Afghan NGOs, including the chairman. It is striking, however, that senior executive staff of ACBAR are still expatriates.

ACBAR is also better geared to large, well-staffed organizations than to small ones. Most ANGOs are thinly staffed and cannot afford to spend as much time attending meetings as their wealthier INGO counterparts. ANGOs which participate in ACBAR are also inclined to feel that their problems differ substantially from those of INGOs, and that ACBAR has made no attempt to target their special needs. Some ANGOs are also not interested in becoming members of ACBAR or the Southwest Afghanistan and Balochistan Agency for Coordination (SWABAC) because they are not willing to share information.

There are some strong advantages to ACBAR membership for ANGOs: added credibility, access to information that is technical in nature or that concerns localities in Afghanistan, access to donors who attend ACBAR meetings, an opportunity to learn about the ways in which other INGOs or the donors are ordering their priorities and arranging their work, a chance to form personal relationships that may at some point facilitate an ANGO's work inside, and a chance to influence standards that may change the way work is done in Afghanistan.

Participation in this forum is useful because it helps ANGOs learn how donors and Western NGOs do business. ANGOS are beginning to recognize advantages in this. A number of groups indicated that they were in the process of applying to ACBAR for membership. Some groups also felt that ACBAR membership would help them establish their legitimacy and that funds would flow once they were admitted to ACBAR. ACBAR membership no doubt helps improve a group's credibility, but it is not a guarantee of donor largesse.

One problem for ACBAR is how it would handle a flood of applications from Afghan groups for membership. This has not happened yet, although the number of applications is increasing. ACBAR could be swamped if its on rules required it to admit 60 or 70 new ANGOs. The larger the membership, the more difficult it will be to accomplish anything and the longer meetings will take.

Some Afghans attending ACBAR meetings have expressed disappointment that ACBAR has not been more effective in reducing competition and has been unable to enforce the various standards and criteria its committee have developed. Certain standards are probably honored more in the breech, while others are gaining hold and are changing the way NGOs do business. ACBAR will never be in a position to enforce acceptance or enforce collaboration. This is something only the donors on which NGOs are dependent can do. In the instance of Khost, where 35 NGOs are now eager to work, UNDP's

position that it will fund no group to work in Khost that does not cooperate in Khost meetings organized by ACBAR is aimed at preventing destructive competition.

ACBAR's most useful role is perhaps in promoting the sharing of information and in trying to draw together information concerning localities or sectors. It has succeeded in obtaining a degree of openness about the activities its members undertake inside.

The only donor that currently requires ACBAR/SWABAC membership is IRC's RAP program. In some instances, RAP has relaxed this requirement but now insists that the group granted funding report its activities to ACBAR's database. It is useful for donors to place emphasis on information-sharing and coordination between groups working in the same area. Donors should require evidence that an NGO is coordinating with and not undercutting other groups working in the same or neighboring areas.

B. Southwest Afghanistan and Balochistan Agency for Coordination (SWABAC)

Seven of SWABAC's much smaller membership are ANGOs, while three applications are pending. A higher percentage of SWABAC's members are ANGOs, perhaps because the assistance community is smaller in Quetta, more informal and more accessible. Three of the five members of SWABAC's Representational Panel (steering committee) are Afghans and two of those are the directors of ANGOs. The chairman, or Representative, as he is called, is Engineer Pushtoon of the Afghan demining agency SWAAD.

SWABAC membership requirements include sharing proposals which are reviewed for competency, a proven ability to complete activities, and a willingness to share information about where the group is working and what it is doing at the village level. SWABAC receives an average of one inquiry concerning membership per month.

Many of the issues, problems and dissatisfactions discussed above in relation to ACBAR also pertain to SWABAC. In the case of SWABAC, which has had to rely on its membership fees to pay all its operating expenses, it has been impossible to waive or reduce the fees themselves. Timely payment of those fees is also important. One ANGO, Maruf Reconstruction Committee (MRC), had to drop out of SWABAC when it could not pay the fees. It hopes to rejoin at some future date. HAFO, which is Peshawar-based but is trying to work in Kandahar and Helmand, belonged to SWABAC but could not afford both SWABAC and ACBAR membership. Since ACBAR relies less on membership fees than SWABAC, it might be useful for ACBAR to consider granting a discount to groups that wish to belong to both organizations because of the location of project sites.

C. Islamic Coordination Council (ICC)

Some Afghan NGOs tried to join the ICC, but the Council, which is small, decided not to admit ANGOs. As noted earlier, Arab donors are not very interested in funding ANGOs, except for those linked to parties that they wish to support. It would have been difficult for the small ICC to develop ANGO admissions criteria that prevented the Council from being overwhelmed by new Afghan groups. ANGOs would have been very interested in joining in part because of the access membership might have been given them by Arab donors.

D. Afghan NGO Coordinating Bureau (ANCB)

Currently, more than 32 ANGOs in Peshawar are participating in an effort to form an Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau (ANCB). On individual expressed his feeling that ANGOs had no choice but to form their own council when the ICC declined to admit ANGOs and ACBAR seemed less capable of meeting many of the needs particular to Afghan NGOs.

Voting for nine officers took place on November 25, 1991. The Afghan Mujahideen Bar Association was in charge of the elections. Principal officers include Engineer Rahim of RAFA as President and Engineer Jawed for HAFO as Vice-President, both of whom continue to be active in ACBAR as well.

ANCB membership criteria include the following requirements:

- the ANGO must be non-political;
- it must have a letter showing community support from inside Afghanistan;
- it must have a record of activities completed inside Afghanistan;
- it must have a board of directors of at least five individuals; and
- it must agree to abide by the ANCB's constitution.

The ANCB's members have high hopes that it will enforce more coordination than ACBAR. For example, one provision in the new ANCB charter calls for the expulsion of members that do not adhere to work standards that the ANCB has set. Such a provision will lead, in all probability, not to the expulsion of errant members but to the failure to gain agreement on standards, since some members may not wish to be obliged to follow certain guidelines. It has been a long and extremely painful process for ACBAR to reach the point that it has reached now, which is not the point at which enforceable standards can be set. It is unlikely in the extreme that it will be any easier for the ANCB to coordinate its membership, which can be expected to grow rapidly and perhaps in a year outnumber ACBAR's membership. Coordination is inherently

difficult and at times impossible. The best intentions in the world will not make the process easier for Afghan NGOs. The larger the ANCB's membership, the more difficult genuine coordination will be.

ANGOs have expressed some concern and surprise about the strong reaction of some INGOs to ANGO efforts to organize themselves. Some INGOs seem to fear that the Afghan Bureau will make coordination more difficult because of the multiplication of coordination groups. Some of the ANCB's members are reportedly opposed to cooperation with ACBAR or within ACBAR.

The ANCB cannot at any time in the near and probably mid-term future serve as a surrogate or replacement for ACBAR. Its founding members control only a very small portion of the total funding going into Afghanistan. Donors may also be far less likely to attend ANCB meetings (should they be permitted to do so) due to the greater likelihood that those meetings will be conducted primarily or entirely in Afghan languages.

There are also some benefits that the ANCB could produce for its members. ANGOs are for the most part newer than their international counterparts, they are less well-funded, they lack strong home offices that provide financial as well as other forms of support, and they often lack a sense of how to deal with donors. The ANCB could provide a much more comfortable forum for them to share problems and learn together. The ANCB could serve as an advocacy group for ANGOs, defending what might at times be separate ANGO interests with donors and INGOs. IF ANGOs are able to speak to the UN in one voice, rather than in 30 or 50 voices, they may be far more persuasive. The real risk for the ANCB will be that it will fragment along personality, political, ethnic, tribal or other lines.

Over the longer term, it would be very beneficial if the ANCB grew strong enough to represent the interests of its membership with a new Afghan government in Kabul and with new donors who came to support that government. The ANCB could then influence government policy in certain sectors (to the extent that its members agreed) as well as continue to find support for members' work in rehabilitating the country.

Quetta-based ANGOs have not been involved in this effort. They reportedly have had a few meetings to discuss issues of common concern. Apparently, there was a move last summer to create a separate Afghan group in Quetta, but the move was forestalled. Given the tiny membership of SWABAC, it makes sense to try to accommodate Afghan NGO needs and concerns within SWABAC.

E. Collaboration Between Like-Minded NGOs

As noted, some groups do help others by sharing computer equipment or vehicles, reviewing and advising on proposals, carrying salaries to a site if staff are headed in that direction, and the like. There are few instances of joint proposals by groups that have complementary skills. This is partly because too many groups are trying to work in all sectors so they compete with rather than complement one another. It is also partly because the grants are so small that there is not much money to divide up. It would be useful if more joint ventures were undertaken on big brother - little brother lines, in other words, an older, more experienced NGO (international or Afghan) matched with a newer, less experienced group. Donors could perhaps do more to encourage joint work. A number of ANGOs indicated an interest in joint ventures. There is a risk, of course, in funding activities being implemented by two groups in that the two may quarrel, bringing the work to a halt.

VII. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING FOR ANGOS

ANGO's need help in a few areas: 1) thinking through what kinds of organizations they want to be and exploring the different options open to them; 2) gaining a better understanding of development issues and planning; 3) increasing their technical capability; and 4) improving management and financial systems. Various donors and INGOs have been trying to assist ANGOs in all four areas through two mechanisms: the provision of technical assistance and the organization of training.

Several donors also provide assistance to ANGOs in developing financial systems and with on-the-job training of accounting staff. Donor accountants who provide this service are stretched rather thin. Most say that more time is needed for advising. The IRC/RAP accountant indicated that he could easily spend 100 percent of his time providing advice to RAP grantees.

A number of ANGOs indicated that they would like to have greater access to occasional short-term technical assistance, but such help is currently beyond their financial means. At this point, if such help were affordable, ANGOs would probably use it primarily for proposal development and perhaps reporting to donors.

Two individuals have been providing more consistent technical assistance to certain ANGOs over a longer period of time. One is Fadl Mohammad, a former Director of Lajnat al-Birr and Human Concern and currently supported by a Canadian NGO. He has been working closely with five or six ANGOs for the last year. He spends roughly one day each week with each group and essentially acts as a special advisor to the director. He helps these groups with day-to-day management problems. He helps the directors learn how to deal with donors and aid systems, and assists with proposal development. He is about to 'graduate' three of the ANGOs he has been working with, and will choose others (including two new women's organizations) to take the place of the graduates.

The second individual is Jane Thomas, also formerly with Human Concern, who has been working for the past year as part of a UNOCA ANGO Pilot Project. She has been particularly useful in helping ANGOs think through what it means in the Western sense to be an NGO and whether that represents an appropriate model for Afghan groups. She began initially working with a few groups but then broadened her support to include others. Earlier this year, she facilitated a workshop on "What is an NGO?" and she also took a group of ANGO directors to Chitral to see the work of the Agha Khan Foundation in creating sustainable village organizations. In providing a forum in which ANGO directors could meet and share their problems, she also served to facilitate the development of the ANCB.

This provision of continuing, but occasional, technical assistance to ANGOs represents a very useful model. Those providing the assistance have a chance to become very familiar with the workings of an ANGO and can target their assistance to areas of greatest need. They can provide on-the-job training using work that the ANGO must accomplish. The ANGOs also develop a relationship of trust and rapport with the advisor and may become more open about problems, pressures and weaknesses. This is an expensive form of support but it may be the most effective model, particularly if it can be focused on a limited number of ANGOs.

B. Training

There is more training available to ANGO staff than technical assistance. This is in part because it is less expensive to conduct training and possible to help a larger number of organizations. However, training, since it tries to meet the needs of 20 or 25 individuals at one time, seeks to identify overlapping needs and therefore cannot target the specific needs or weakness of any one individual or institution. This is not to suggest that training is irrelevant. It is important for ANGO staff, and ANGO directors list a host of training needs, including accounting, English, filing and office skills, computer skills, proposal development, monitoring, communication techniques, dealing with donors, and management.

A few ANGOs indicate a strong interest in training in technical areas such as engineering. There is a clear need to upgrade professional skills. Some ANGOs are not interested in training. They feel too many resources are spent on training the same small pool of people who seldom leave Pakistan. Most ANGOs interviewed had sent staff to two or more workshops in the last twelve months, and often it was the same individuals attending.

There are or will soon be more than adequate training opportunities in Peshawar. There is, however, an imbalance, with very few opportunities for training being offered in Quetta. It is also harder to find well trained staff in Quetta, making the need for Quetta-based training more critical. Much of the training that is also currently offered is also for Pakistan-based office staff. There is little organized training going on in Afghanistan for ANGO field staff, although more workshops are beginning to be offered in Peshawar for field staff. Increasingly, training is offered in Dari and Pushto, which makes it accessible to a larger number of Afghans.

A number of INGOs provide training for their own staff and sometimes they include ANGO staff. This sort of training is the most useful because it is the most targeted to an institution's objectives. Some donors or INGOs offer training that targets NGO

staff or is open to the Afghan public. ANGOs generally lack both the expertise and the staff resources to organize their own in-service training. They are dependant on other organizations for training opportunities. One training need is to improve the ability of supervisory staff in ANGOs to train their own lower level field staff.

UNOCA has provided some formal training through Jane Thomas. More importantly, perhaps, it has funds to pay for short courses for ANGO staff. Unfortunately, not many ANGOs appear to know about this possibility. The cost of training was one obstacle cited by some ANGOs to upgrading staff skills.

Currently, three organizations appear to provide training in topics related to engineering: VITA, IRC and DACAAR. Some of this training is offered in the afternoons, over the period of several weeks. FAO and UNDP provide training in certain facets of agriculture to NGO staff implementing grants they have awarded. USAID funds training in construction skills. MSH provides training in management, basic administration, and drug supply and logistics to its Afghan implementing partners. IRC, Save the Children Fund-UK (SCF-UK), and MSH have provided training in accounting to ANGO staff. IRC's Public Administration Program provides training in English and office skills to Afghan refugees, some of whom work for ANGOs.

Some NGOs have sent staff to the Pakistan Institute of Management Studies in Karachi. Most of this training seems to be inappropriate for Afghans and for NGO staff, since it is geared to the Pakistani private sector and participants often break into Urdu or Sindhi.

Both IRC's RAP office and SCF-UK have developed training programs to target INGO and ANGO Afghan management and field staff. SCF-UK developed short-term training programs initially in response to the needs of Afghan staff working with refugees but then expanded its program to include cross-border staff and groups. It has offered two-week management courses for mid-level managers, as well as community participation and Training of Trainers workshops.

IRC/RAP has begun offering training primarily for those Afghan staff of the ANGOs and INGOs which it funds. Because this includes a small group of ANGOs at present, it may be possible to target needs more effectively than those training programs that are open to any NGO's staff. IRC may also develop a clearer sense of the training requirements of those groups with which it has gained experience through the provision of funding and technical assistance. IRC/RAP offers training in community participation, administration and management, record keeping and report writing, data collection and monitoring, and field accounting as part of its program. Heavy emphasis is placed on training field staff. It has

also joined with another branch of IRC to offer training in facets of agriculture extension. Six of the eight IRC/RAP trainers have recent experience working in Afghanistan. This should give them some understanding of field implementation problems.

The problem is not with the availability of training, except as noted in Quetta. There may also be too few opportunities for field staff. The problem is more with the capacity of ANGOs to absorb training. There are few headquarters staff to train and these individuals may travel to Afghanistan frequently or the agency may not be able to afford to release them. Field staff can only be trained in Pakistan during the winter. They cannot be released during the primary work seasons because there are too few of them. The same ANGO individuals appear to be sent for training over and over. Often they are the staff just below the organization's director, who does not have time to attend a two or three week course. It is also not cost-effective for ANGOs to release for training staff that they may not be able to pay in two months' time.

Another issue is coordination. Training is offered by different organizations in similar or the same subjects. Approaches or topics covered may differ. If an ANGO sends three of its staff to three different seminars in the same subject, those staff may come away with three different ideas that they wish to implement. A few of those interested in training issues, including UNOCA, expressed disappointment in the ACBAR Training Subcommittee's inability to bring about closer coordination and more joint training. One helpful development was the information day for Afghan training programs held December 12, 1991. This provided information about which organizations offer what kind of training and may have helped NGOs access training opportunities.

On top of the training already available, GTZ plans to fund a ten year, $5 million training program with the bulk of its funds being directed toward training ANGO staff. This program initially will be administered through UNOCA although there is discussion of UNDP taking it over. GTZ plans two types of training for ANGOs, each with different clients: 1) short-term training in various subjects for ANGO directors and deputy directors, at this point a pool of at most 200 people; and 2) training for "young professionals" or promising mid-level ANGO staff for a period of five months.

The implementors, once they reach Peshawar in July 1992, may find that a re-design of the project is advisable. The amount of funding allocated and the number of training days to be provided may be out of proportion to what ANGOs can absorb. The small number of ANGO directors and deputies (often there is not a second in command) may not be able to take the time for extensive training and still manage their organizations. In addition, there are very

few ANGOs that could afford at this point to release mid-level staff for five months' of training. Only those with the greatest external support could afford to replace a staff member for the period of training. The project could also increase competition over trainees between NGOs and USAID contractors currently offering training and the GTZ project staff.

USAID will be also funding a $34 million human resources development project that will offer several kinds of short and long-term training: vocational training, entrepreneurship, office skills and management training, engineering, business and economics, and topics related to development. Some of this training continues the work done in existing programs, and some of it will duplicate training offered by other groups. This project hopes to establish training centers in Quetta and in Afghanistan as well as in Peshawar. Much of this training will be accessible to NGO staff but it does not specifically target them, except in a few instances. The project includes one very useful provision for providing resident consultants to interested NGOs on a continuing basis, following the same approach that Fadl Mohammed follows in his work.

There is a large amount of training available to Afghan NGOs, particularly of the short-term variety. It is a bit difficult to see, under current political and economic circumstances, how the Afghans are going to absorb all this training and put it to use. There are already a large number of Afghans who cannot find jobs in their area of training. Those offering skill training to the unemployed have some obligation to ensure that employment opportunities exist in the fields in which training is provided.

Some of the USAID and GTZ funding could perhaps be used to support better coordination of training activities and perhaps to sponsor joint training activities for field staff. Some international NGOs offering training expressed concern that the GTZ and USAID projects would pay Afghan trainers higher salaries than they were able to pay, thereby luring away their own trainers, in whom they had invested considerable resources. The pool of experienced Afghan trainers is very small.

USAID and GTZ could also support the development of training materials which the different organizations offering training could use. There seems to be little rationale in different agencies each developing their own management training or community participation materials. It duplicates effort and, as noted earlier, may end up confusing their clients.

Short-term training is most useful when linked to technical assistance. This can follow or precede formal instruction with help oriented to an individual's or organization's specific needs. It is also most effective when the same organization sends two or

more staff to a workshop. Those staff provide reinforcement to one another in trying new approaches and ideas once back at work and can help bring about an atmosphere that supports change. Training can also be more cost-effective if it is linked to continuous funding that gives a group both experience on the job and the resources to retain their newly-trained employees. More training should probably be offered on an intra-agency basis rather than an inter-agency basis and should focus on organizational development requirements and planning.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The number of Afghan NGOs will probably continue to grow, at least for a while. Not all that have currently been formed will survive, although many may continue, due to the lack of better employment opportunities, to live a sort of a half-life for some period of time. The number now exceeds the funds available and the capacity of donors to guide and monitor. The large number of Afghan and international groups has permitted an increase in the number of rehabilitation activities and their expansion into remote parts of the country. At the same time, it has meant that NGOs, both international and Afghan, are have crowded into some of the more popular and accessible parts of Afghanistan, leading to wasteful competition and inefficient use of resources. It has also meant that multiple standards prevail, making a mess which it will take years for any future government to sort out. In addition, scarce funds are being wasted on approximately 200 INGO and ANGO office rents, utilities, duplicated equipment, etc.

While it would be useful to encourage consolidation of ANGOs (and for that matter INGOs), in practice this probably will not work. The trend, if anything, is in favor of fragmentation. No INGOs working from a Pakistan base have merged and some have split, so organizational egotism is not peculiar to ANGOs. This proliferation of groups has made it harder for ANGOs to obtain funds, has generated more suspicion in the aid community about these groups and heightened competition between all NGOs.

All donors would like to devise mechanical criteria for determining eligibility for funding because this would reduce the necessity of making subjective judgements about the worth of an organization. At this point, the only pre-conditions that suggest some degree of accountability are 1) the existence of an acceptable external audit (donors could directly contract for the audit to obtain a more objective report) or an audit that the donor itself has carried out to its satisfaction; 2) an adequate number of staff qualified in the sector in which the proposal has been made and a track record of successfully implementing a project in that sector; 3) a more than nominal community contribution; 4) evidence that senior staff spend considerable time in Afghanistan; 5) few staff in Pakistan relative to staff based in or spending most of their time in Afghanistan; 6) the proposal to work in an area where it has a permanent field office; 7) the proposal to work in areas in which monitoring is possible; and 8) evidence that the ANGO's spending priorities are on beneficiary-targeted activities and not the acquisition of unnecessary or status-symbol equipment (for example, operating a Suzuki vehicle instead of a Pajero).

While a policy of spreading resources among a large number of groups may give some protection against unacceptable losses to donors or political impact, it probably offers less protection than

some careful checking at the outset. Donors have some responsibility to the Afghan people to be clear about whom they are funding. The kind of monitoring that currently takes place with the sorts of pressures that are put on monitors does not consistently answer questions about a group's objectives. More shared or joint monitoring would be useful, and donors need to talk to a range of parties who might have information and views on the concerned group. While a one hundred per cent consensus may not emerge, enough will emerge that alarm bells may be triggered. The tighter the political links of a group are thought to be, the more thorough the monitoring needs to be.

Most donors are not at this point interested in supporting the growth of voluntary agencies. They are interested in identifying and funding organizations that can be effective partners and which can work across party and commander boundaries. Therefore, they implicitly if not explicitly allow a very broad definition of NGO to prevail. Some donors appear to see ANGOs as short-term expedients through which large amounts of funding can be quickly spent, and they have only the most limited commitment to helping Afghan groups establish themselves for the longer term.

If an objective is also to contribute to the demilitarization of Afghan society and to enlarge society's civil voice through support for the emergence of civilian groups that can someday play an intermediary role between individuals and the government, then there is a need to try to separate out which groups most fit the voluntary agency mold and to encourage and support those.

ANGOs will continue to be dependent on external resources. This is true of Pakistani NGOs and those in many other developing countries as well. Afghan NGOs have no government ministries from which they can seek funding, and no bankers from whom they can obtain short-term loans to cover cash-flow problems. There is almost no way in this environment that they can become less dependent on external largesse. Communities may contribute toward project costs, but they are unlikely to cover institutional overheads.

No NGO can plan for its organization given the current funding pattern of short-term, small grants. It would be difficult to do a six month plan, let alone a one year plan. Most ANGOs are expanding in an unplanned fashion into sectors for which they believe they can secure funding. This is not a recipe for organizational success, but they have little choice given the way donors currently handle funding.

Limited donor support for overhead and administrative charges makes it difficult for groups which do not have some consistent source of external funding to improve their capacity and efficiency. Once a group has an established and satisfactory track record, it would

be appropriate for donors, and UN donors in particular, to bear a larger burden of the overhead costs. Donors could also be helpful in funding groups to develop activities that would produce some kind of income that could support the group in its work. In addition, donors could join together and work with those Afghan groups that have proved responsive to help them develop and carry out annual plans, with reasonable overhead costs being shared between the principal donors.

Short-term, small grants are also not conducive to work in some sectors. While a karez can be cleaned in a matter of weeks, activities promoting education, health or horticulture crops are, by their very nature, longer term. As long as funding continues to be short-term, it will be difficult to undertake large projects in some sectors. It is expensive in terms of donor staff time to administer a large number of grants to a large number of organizations and monitor the results. In addition, it is difficult if not impossible to determine the economic and social impact of many little projects scattered over a huge area. In the current environment, though, how does one decide what the priority needs of the Afghan people are? Few ANGOs (and INGOs for that matter) are capable of undertaking work on complex projects. When donors wish to fund more complicated endeavors, they will probably need additional staff to supervise NGOs in carrying out the work.

Donors should do more to encourage community contributions in ANGO work for several reasons: 1) it reduces the cost of rehabilitation; 2) communities are more likely to sustain the activity; 3) communities will insist on greater accountability from the ANGO if they are involved in its work and paying part of the cost; and 4) it may reduce the interest or the ability of the group to favor kinfolk or meet political objectives if charges for goods or services are levied. The closer the cost is to the real market cost, the less there may be bias in the distribution of assistance.

While community cost-sharing is desirable, not all ANGOs want to be or should be groups engaged in small-scale community development. There is room for a variety of organizational models. Some, if they survive, will not end up as voluntary agencies. The groups with predominant capability in engineering have for the most part indicated a strong interest in becoming engineering design and construction firms. Engineering is an expensive business and, if these groups are to be able to undertake more sophisticated pieces of engineering in the future, they will require a profit they can reinvest in their business.

It is impossible to guess what the future of these ANGOs might be. This will depend on both continuing donor interest in funding Afghan NGOs and the attitude of the future government toward NGOs. There will be probably less funding available for NGOs as donors shift to supporting government ministries. The future government

may view NGOs as rivals for donor resources and could be suspicious of non-governmental organizations working directly with communities. Of course, some Afghan NGOs are likely to become a part of the new government. At that time, donors will be able to play a positive role by stressing the complementarity of NGO and government efforts and by structuring their support to reinforce that complementarity.

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Appendix A

ANNOTATED LIST OF AFGHAN NGOS*

April 12, 1992

* The groups on this list include all ANGOs identified by the consultants during the course of the study, by IRC/RAP, and by Mr. Don Meyers, consultant to ACBAR. Inclusion on this list does not imply any sort of official recognition or endorsement by IRC/RAP. This list may not be fully complete or accurate.

RURAL REHABILITATION

1 AAA
Afghan Aid Association
Dr. Ghulam Farouq Mirany, Dr. Khoshal
Abu Noman Plaza, Tehkal Bala, Jamrud Road (across from the airport), Peshawar
GPO Box 299
Tel. 45519

2 ACLU
Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit
Eng. Moh'd Karim
4-A/C Park Avenue Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41205/44578

3 ACRD
Afghan Center for Rural Development
Amin Ruhani Wardak, Najib Baba
Bungalow 3, Street 4, Jehangirabad, University Town, Peshawar
P.O. Box 849
Tel. 41133/44933

4 ADA
Afghan Development Association
Ghulam Jelani Popal
34-C/3A-1 Circular Road, University Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 992
Tel. 44779/42230

5 ADAg
Afghan Development Agency
Qamaruddin, Arbab Dost Mohammed
Khyber View Plaza, Jamrud Road (near Yummy's 36), Peshawar
UPO Box 695
Tel. 40743

6 AINA
Afghanistan Islamic National Agency
Eng. Bashir
Peshawar

7 ANCO
Afghan Narcotics Control Organization
Moh'd Akbar Sadat
House 27, Sector N/4, Phase IV, Hayatabad
GPO Box 461
Tel. 812437

8 APA
Afghan Planning Agency
S. M. Roshan
House No. 7 Pawaka Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41115

9 APA
Afghan Planning Agency
Eng. M. Qasem Tahiri
Quetta

10 APWO
Afghan Public Welfare Organization
Eng. Abdul Sattar
Arbab Road, Bangash House (near Jabbar Flats), Peshawar
Tel. 40504

11 ARA
Agriculture Rehabilitation of Afghanistan
Prof. Ghulam Haidar Rasul
754-T Arbab Road, Arbab Colony, Peshawar

12 ARAA
Aryana Reconstruction Agency for Afghanistan
Hajji Moh'd Hashim Zahid
House of Maqbuli Khan, #3 Bilal Street, Academy Town, Peshawar
Tel. 44628/41664

13 ARCAR
Aryana Rehabilitation Committee for Afghan Reconstruction
Dr. Humayun
36 Spinzar Plaza, Jehangirabad, Peshawar
Tel. 44986

14 ARDA
Agency for Rural Development of Afghanistan
Khaled Rashid
Canal Lane, Peshawar
GPO Box 540
Tel. 44349/42588

15 ARDO
Afghanistan Rehabilitation and Development Organization
Eng. Moh'd Inam
Room 311 Gul Hajji Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
Tel. 44750

16 ARF
Afghan Relief Foundation
Syed Ishaq Gailani
House 42, Street 5, G-3, Phase 2, Hayatabad, Peshawar
Tel. 811261/810105

17 ARIA
Authority for the Reconstruction of Infrastructure in Afghanistan
Faruq Azam
2 Park Road near Solidarite Afghanistan, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41762

18 ARO
Afghanistan Rehabilitation Organization
Azimullah Niazi
House 179, D-1, Phase 1, Hayatabad
Tel. 811579

19 ARPD
Afghanistan Reconstruction and Planning Department
Haji Mian Mohammad Hassan Qadari
Hayatabad
UPO Box 1453
Tel. 219303

20 ARR
Afghan Relief & Rehabilitation
Aziz Karzai, Hamid Gailani
Sariab Road, opposite Balochistan University, Quetta
PO Box 56
Tel. 41616

21 ARS
Afghanistan Reconstruction Services
Habib Wasil
c/o SAG office, Peshawar

22 ATHA
Afghan Taskforce for Humanitarian Assistance

23 BCURA
Baz Construction Unit for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan
Eng. Abdullah Shamimi
House 450, Street 27, D/4, Phase 1, Hayatabad

24 BCBMPO
Bana Construction & Building Material Production Organization
Peshawar
Tel. 40731

25 BRAA
Bakhtar Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan
Sayed Manucher Kayani
House No. 1, Street 2, Dalazak Road, Sultan Colony
Peshawar

26 BRC
Badghis Reconstruction Committee

27 BRC
Behezad Reconstruction Committee (Herat-based)

28 BRNA Bureau for the Reconstruction of Northern Afghanistan
Haji Abdul Ghafoor Zalmai
Old Bara Road, Afzal Abad, Abdara, Peshawar
UPO Box #939

29 BURC Bakhtar Unity Reconstruction Council
Sayed A. Ghafoor
School Building (2nd floor), Alamdar Road, near Yazdam Road, Quetta
Tel. 75442

30 CoAR Coordination of Afghan Relief
Eng. Moh'd Naim Salimi
71-E-5 Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41188

31 CAS Commite Afghan de Solidarite
Dr. Ayoub Zhian
off Jamrud Road, Tambuan, Takhal Bala, Peshawar
GPO Box 36
Tel. 44510/44610

32 CBR Consultant's Bureau for Reconstruction
Eng. Kamaluddin
19 Canal Bank Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 43693

33 CCA Cooperation Center for Afghanistan
Eng. Moh'd Esmail Hussaini
House No. 69, D-4, Phase 1, Hayatabad
GPO Box 460
Tel. 810752/79364

34 CHA Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
Abdul Salaam Rahimy
46-B, Sector 4, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 40022

35 CIUP Construction and Irrigation Unit of Pamir
Obaidullah Seerat
Hayatabad
Tel. 810381

36 CRAA Committee for Rehabilitation Aid to Afghanistan
Sana-ul-Haq Ahmadzai
Room 130, Gul Hajji Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar

37 CRFA Cultural & Relief Foundation for Afghanistan
Moh'd Ali Tarshi
Street no. 7, Shaheen Town, University Road, Peshawar
Tel. 43281

38 CRR
Center for Rural Reconstruction
Wali
c/o UNO/MTP, Peshawar
Tel. 42103

39 EAFA
Environmental Awareness Foundation for Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai
Block #4, Satelite Town, Hajji Par-u-Din House, #103
A-E/3, Quetta
Tel. 42968

40 EMAR
Engineering Management for Afghan Reconstruction
Eng. Zahid, Eng. Fazl Omar
off Jamrud Road, opposite Gul Hajji Plaza near petrol station, Peshawar
Tel. 44318/40940

41 ESAR
Engineering Services for Afghan Reconstruction
Eng. A. Manan Amiri
off Canal Road, Bilal Street, Academy Town, Peshawar
Tel. 44306

42 FRF
Farah Reconstruction Foundation
Haji Abdul Khaliq
House no. 366-5I-Block 3, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 44897

43 FWSAD
Free Welfare Society for Afghan Disabled
A. Rahman Sahak
House No. 3, Canal Lane, Canal Road, University Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 1463
Tel. 43905

44 GRC
Gharjestan Reconstruction Council
Moh'd Sarwar Toofan
House No. 50-C, Street 8, Alamdar Road, Nasirabad, Quetta
PO Box 8

45 HAFO
Helping Afghan Farmer Organization
Eng. Sayed Jawed
71-E Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 1010
Tel. 44677

46 HIIA
Haraket Inqilab-e-Islami Afghanistan
Abdul Wahid

47 HKRO
Hindu Kush Rehabilitation Organization
Spinzar Plaza, Jehangirabad, Peshawar

48 HRC
Herat Rehabilitation Council
No. 3 Arbab Colony Street, next to the Kuwait Red Crescent Society female OPD clinic, Peshawar

49 HRO
Helmand Rehabilitation Organization
Eng. Obedullah, Hajji Mohammed
Bilal Colony, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 43722

50 IAAAE
Islamic Association of Afghan Architects and Engineers
Eng. Ghulam Mutawazi
B-4, New Arbab Colony, Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 40751

51 IODARR
Islamic Organization Defending Afghan Refugee Rights (same as Islamic Foundation for Afghan Refugee Rights/IFARR)
Mohammad Ismael Arghandeh
Peshawar

52 IURCA
Islamic Unity Reconstruction Council of Afghanistan
Eng. Moh'd Ali
House 7-26/21-A Nachari, Alamdar Road, Quetta
PO Box 436
Tel. 76576

53 JCE
Jehad Consulting Engineers
Hashmatullah Mujededi
Room 208, Gul Hajji Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
Tel. 42038

54 JCKP
Jehad Council of Kabul Province
Mohammed Bilal Nairam
Bord, Nasar Bagh Road, Street #2, Peshawar

55 KAG
Khorasan Assistance Group
Mirza Hussain Abdullahi
House no. 7-66/23 (3613), Alamdar Road, Mariabad
P.O. Box 411
Quetta tel. 75965

56 KF
Koh-i-noor Foundation
Haji Moh'd Daoud
off Old Bara Road, Afzalabad, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 44359/42405

57 KMA
Kandahar Momenyar Agency
Haji Moh'd Ali
Satellite Town, Near Gool Musjed, B11 97
Quetta tel. 41209

58 KRO Kunar Rehabilitation Organization

59 KTE Kokchah Trading & Engineering (PVT) Ltd.
Eng. Rasheed Ahmad
GPO Box 320, Peshawar
Tel. 241127

60 KWO Khanabad Welfare Organization

61 LRO Laghman Rehabilitation Organization
Qasim Niazi
House #2 Akbar Street. Academy Town, Peshawar
Tel. 44278/44306

62 MAWO Mazzina Assistance and Welfare Organization
Syed Amar Tahseen
Room 6, 2nd Floor, Khyber Plaza
Peshawar

63 MRC Maruf Reconstruction Committee
Nasrullah Khan Barakzai
House no. 13, Block no. 5, Bilal Colony, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 43803

64 MWRA Maidan Wardak Relief Agency

65 NC Nuristani Construction
Commander Malawi Afzal
Kunar

66 NRCA Naisan Reconstruction Council for Afghanistan
Eng. Abu Muslim Mukhtar
43-B, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 45286

67 NRO Nimroz Rehabilitation Organization
Abdul Ghani
House 331, Block 3, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 41271

68 PARC Paktya Agriculture Rehabilitation Committee

69 PRB Pamir Reconstruction Bureau
Eng. Kabir
T-1136 Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41641

70 PRS Paktika Reconstruction Services
Abdul Moqeem Rahmanzai/Abdul Salam Gailani
Peshawar
UPO Box 790
Tel. 0342-385046

71 RACA Research and Advisory Center for Afghanistan
Dr. Kakhar

72 RAFA Reconstruction Authority for Afghanistan
Eng. Abdul Rahim
19 Gul Mohar Lane, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 44867

73 RCA Rehabilitation of Central Afghanistan
Baryalai Sajad
Peshawar
Tel. 45571

74 RCCA Reconstruction Council for Central Afghanistan
Mirza Hussein Khakyar
House 167, D-4, Phase 1, Hayatabad, Peshawar
Tel. 812586

75 RDA Reconstruction & Rural Development of Afghanistan
Zaid Haidari
Room 301, Gul Hajji Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
UPO Box 1492
Tel. 0342-370405

76 RDM Rural Development of Maihan
Abdul Ahad Maihanyar
Murad Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
Tel. 45541

77 RDW Rural Development of Wardak
Abdul Wahab Kemal

78 RIFRA Relief Institution for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan
Gul Agha Sherzai, Eng. Obeidullah
House 8143, Block 4, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 43722

79 ROL Rehabilitation Organization of Logar

80 RRC Resalat's Relief Committee
Saeed Asadullah

81 SBCSO Shahidi Balkhi Cultural & Service Organization

82 SJAWO Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani Welfare Organization
Hajji Ghulam Dastagir
Dar-ul-Khair Road, across from Islamiya College, Niamat Mahal Board, UPO Box 974, Peshawar
Tel. 42763

83 START Short Term Assistance for Rehabilitation
Eng. Mohd. Shah
51-C Park Avenue, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41081

84 SRC Sistan Reconstruction Council
Dr. Ghulam Dastagir
PO Box 22, Quetta

85 SRO Showrak Rehabilitation Organization
Haji Mohammad
House 38, Bilal Colony, Satellite Town, Quetta

86 SWFAO Southwest Farmers' Assistance Organization
Essa Kharoti
House no. D-52, Samagali Housing Scheme, Samangali Road, Quetta
PO Box 499
Tel. 71835/71933

87 TPRA Telecommunications and Power Reconstruction for Afghanistan
Eng. Moh'd Nizam
Room 315 Gul Hajji Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
Tel. 41092

88 TRC Takhar Reconstruction Committee
Mr. Takhwar
No office in Pakistan

89 VARA Voluntary Association for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan
Najimuddin Mojedidi
House 269-O Block 3, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 40374

90 WOA Welfare Organization for Afghanistan

91 WRC Welfare & Relief Committee
Waliullah Ghulam
8-D Park Road, University Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 1097
Tel. 42237

92 WROR Welfare and Relief Organization for Reconstruction
Eng. Ahmed Shah
Khyber View Plaza (opposite Yummy's 36), Jamrud Road, Peshawar

MEDICAL

93 ACH Afghan Children's Hospital
Dr. N. Latif
House 190, E-1, Phase 1, Hayatabad
Tel. 811380

94 AHDS Afghan Health & Devt. Services
Dr. Najibullah, Aziz R. Qarghah
House 452, D-2, Phase 1, Hayatabad
GPO Box 637
Tel. 810599

95 AMIC Afghan Medical Information Center
Dr. Mirwais
Canal Lane, Canal Road, University Town, Peshawar

96 AOGH Afghan Obstetrics & Gynaecology Hospital
Dr. M. Hussain Momand
2-A Circular Road, University Town, Peshawar
GPO Box 448
Tel. 40721

97 AHSAO Afghan Health & Social Assistance Organization
Moh'd Wasim Ludin
1427-T Old Bara Road, University Town, UPO Box 753, Peshawar
Tel. 42152/44597

98 AMA Afghan Medical Aid
Dr. Dilawar Sabary, Dr. Ahmad Sher Zamani
5B Park Road, Speen Jamat, University Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 689
Tel. 43283

99 AWC Afghan Welfare Center
Dr. Rahim Pushtoonyar
Street No. 4, Nasr Bagh Road, Nasr Bagh
Tel. 40116

100 DCAR Dental Clinic for Afghan Refugees
Dr. Sher Aqa Baloch
House 1, Jamal Road, Shaheen Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 356
Tel. 43358

101 ECAR Eye Clinic for Afghan Refugees
Dr. Abdulhay Mujahid
Street. No. 3, Shaheen Town, Peshawar
Tel. 44928

102 HCCP Health Committee for the Central Provinces
Harakat i Islami - Mohseni
Peshawar

103 HCNP Health Committee for Northern Provinces
Shura-i-Nizar/Dr. Wasiq
68E-2 Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar
Peshawar tel. 41922

104 IAHC Islamic Aid Health Center
Dr. Haqqani
House 90-E, Block 5, Satellite Town, Quetta
PO Box 293
Tel. 44780/41518

105 IMIA Ittehadia Mujahideen Islami Afghanistan
Abdul Hussain Makhsoudi
Block 1, Hazara Town, Brewery, Quetta
Tel. 70431

106 MMC Mujahideen Medical Center
Dr. Assadullah Reha
Room 310, Gul Hajji Plaza, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
Tel. 44682

107 PAAR Physician Association for Afghan Refugees
Dr. Sayed Rahim
Street 8, Jamal Road, Shaheen Town, Peshawar
Tel. 42987

108 UMCA United Medical Center for Afghans
Dr. Abdul Rashid Babaker Khel
Gulabad Secondary Board, Jamrud Road, Peshawar
GPO Box 33
Tel. 41697

WOMEN'S GROUPS

109 AMWS Afghan Muslim Women's Society
Mrs. Khurshid, c/o Muhammed Shah, START Director
E7 Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar

110 AWDA Afghan Women's Development Association
Eng. Hidayatullah, Ms. Saida Safi
Bangash House, Warsak Road, Kebabian, Peshawar

111 AWEC Afghan Women's Education Center
Mahbooba Kharo Khel
House # 195, Street. 57, G 9/4, Islamabad
Tel. 859489

112 AWRC Afghan Women's Resource Center
Najia Qureishi
Shah Mumtaz Ali House, Osmania Lane off Arbab Road,
University Town, Peshawar
UPO Box 1421
Tel. 44052

113 AWWO Afghan Women's Welfare Organization
Zohra

114 DAWA Development Agency for Women of Afghanistan
Fatimah

115 IOAW Islamic Organization of Afghan Women
Fatima Yasir
Peshawar tel. 71826

116 MAARWI Muslim Association of Afghan Refugee Women in Islamabad
House no. 275, Street 16, G 10/2, Islamabad
Tel. 281228

117 MH Malalai Hospital
Eng. Saddiqi
Quetta

118 MSOA Muslim Sisters Organization of Afghanistan
contact Fazl Rahman Minhaj
House 48 Street 53, D-2, Phase 1, Hayatabad
GPO 358
Tel. 81167 (evenings)

119 SC Shuhada Clinic
Dr. Sima Samar
House no. 7-68/91-91(A) Alamdar Road, Naser Abad,
Quetta
Tel. 76934

DE-MINING GROUPS

120 ATC Afghan Technical Consultants
Kafayatullah Ablagh
Abdara and Old Jamrud Roads, House No. 45/D4,
University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 41038/40412

121 MCPA
Mine Clearance Planning Agency
Atiqullah (OIC)
House 58, Street 4, H-2, Phase 2, Hayatabad
Tel. 810803/812599

122 SWAAD
Southwest Afghanistan Agency for Demining
Eng. Pashtun
House 34, Bilal Colony, Satellite Town, Quetta
Tel. 43722

OTHER

123 ADICC
Al-Dawa Islamic Cultural Center
Abdul Majid
Hayatabad

124 AMBA
Afghan Mujahideen Bar Association
Rohani
Bord

125 CJEA
The Contemporary Jehad Encyclopedia of Afghanistan
Hayatabad

126 GAiC
German Aid Committee
Maqsoudi
Hazara Town, Quetta

127 IHSA
Independent Humanitarian Services Organization
Habib Zalmai
c/o UNOCA, Peshawar

128 IN
Inside Now
Dr. Delawar Sahary
Spinzar Plaza, Jehangirabad, Peshawar

129 ITHE
Institute of Teachers of Higher Education
Dr. Asim
off Old Bara Road, University Town, Peshawar
Tel. 40940

130 OMA
Organization for Mine Awareness
Fazal Karim Fazal
D-3/21, Street 9, 2nd Ghazali Road, Phase 1, Hayatabad
Tel. 810978/812084

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Appendix B

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

UN AGENCIES

UNOCA

Bart Vrolijk, Peshawar Field Office
Naveed Hussain, Islamabad
Tanweer Shahzada, Islamabad
Jane Thomas, ANGO Consultant

UNDP

Robert Eaton, Islamabad

UNDCP

Andrew Pryce, Peshawar

WFP

Mr. Adar, Quetta

FAO

Anthony Fitzherbert, Islamabad

UNHCR

Robert Breen, Peshawar

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees

Col. Hafiz, Assistant Commissioner

OTHER DONORS

Asia Foundation	Elizabeth White, Peshawar
Canada Fund	R.A. Ghafoori, Peshawar
EEC	Willi Demeier, Peshawar
Help (Germany)	Norbert Burger, Peshawar
Help the Afghans Foundation	Anthony van der Bundt, Peshawar
Norwegian Refugee Council/Norwegian Church Aid	Terje Skavdal, Peshawar
Office of the AID Representative	Albert Nehoda, Peshawar Zia Mojedidi, Quetta

IRC

RAP OFFICE

Andrew Wilder
Eng. M. Hashim
William Miller
Lisa Laumann
James Robertson
Olwen Herbison
Javed Akhtar

Public Administration Program

Eng. Aziz Osmani

ACBAR

Jon Bennet
Nancy Dupree, ARIC
Shakir

SWABEC

Nancy Leech

INTERNATIONAL NGOS

LEPCO, Quetta	Dr. John Gibbs-Smith
Management Sciences for Health, Peshawar	Dr. L. Laumonier
Mercy Corps, Int., Quetta	Myron Jesperson, Rahmatullah
Muslim Aid, Peshawar	Imad Saleem, Dr. Saleem
Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Peshawar	Kristian Berg
RONCO, Quetta	Earl Thieme
Salvation Army, Peshawar	Capt. Ivor Telfer
Save the Children, UK, Peshawar	Paul Emes, Umer
Save the Children, US, Islamabad	Paul Fishstein
Swedish Committee, Peshawar	Bo Elding
VITA	Eng. Mir Mohammed Sediq

OTHER

Fadl Mohammed, ANGO Consultant, Peshawar
Nick Gardner, Quetta
Deborah Turrel, Quetta
Nasir-ul-Mulk, Barrister, Peshawar
Bruce Wannell, Peshawar

AFGHAN NGOS

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

AAA	Dr. Kushal
ACRoad	Kulandari; Amin Wardak's brother
ADA (Association)	Ghulam Jelani Popal
ADA (Agency)	Qamaruddin
ARA	Professor Ghulam Haidar
ARIA	Dr. Faruq Azam
ARO	Azimullah Niazi
ARR	Aziz Karzai, Ghulam Muhayuddin
BURC	Sayed A. Ghafoor
CoAR	Eng. Naim
CAS	Dr. Ayub
CCA	Eng. Ali Hussaini
CBR	Eng. Kamaluddin, Eng. Rahim
CHA	Abdul Nasser
CRFA	Moh'd Ali Tarshi
CRAA	Dr. Sana'a ul-Haq
EMAR	Eng. Zahid

Afghan NGOs, Reconstruction, cont.

ESAR	Eng. Hakim Gul, Eng. Hiyatullah
FRF	Hajji Abdul Khaliq
FWSAD	A. Rahman Sahak
GRC	Moh'd Sarwar Toofan
HAFO	Eng. Sayed Jawed
JCE	Hashmatullah Mojedidi
KAG	Mirza Abdullahi
KF	Anne Hurd, Steve Masty
LRO	Qasim Niazi
MRC	Nasrullah Barakzai
PRB	Eng. Kabir
RAFA	Eng. Rahim
RoadA	Zaid Haidari
START	Eng. Mohammed Shah
SJAWO	Ghulam Dastagir
SWFAO	Essa Kharoti, Abdurrahman
TCP	Eng. Nizam
VARA	Najimuddin Mojedidi

MEDICAL

AHSAO	Dr. Ludin
HCNP	Dr. Wasiq
IMIA	Abdul Hussain Maqsoodi
IAHC	Dr. Haqqani
OB/GYN Hospital	Dr. Mohmand
PCA	Dr. Rahim, Dr. Nassifi, Mohammed Rasool, Mrs. Sima

WOMEN'S GROUPS

AWDA	Eng. Hidayatullah
AWWO	Zohra, Maliha
Shuhada Hospital	Dr. Sima Samar

DEMINING GROUPS

MCPA	Sayed Aqa
SWAAD	Eng. Pushtoon

OTHER

OMA	Fazal Karim